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Abstract
Three models of a privately informed contract designer (a principal) are examined. In
the first, I study how much private information the principal wants to acquire before
offering a contract to an agent. Despite allowing her to acquire all information for
free, I prove in a general environment that there is a nontrivial set of parameters for
which it is strictly suboptimal for the principal to be completely informed, regardless
of the continuation equilibrium following any information acquisition choice. This
result holds even when the principal is able to employ the most general mechanisms
available and, in particular, when she can choose her most favourable full-information
continuation equilibria. Further, in a specialized environment I characterize the prin-
cipal’s optimal information choice.
The second is a two-state principal-agent model with moral hazard in which the
principal knows the state but the agent does not. This model is relevant to situations
where an employer has private information about the productivity of a worker in a
particular task while the worker has private information about the effort she exerts on
the job. Much of the literature on this subject restricts the employer to offer contracts
that leave her no discretion once a contract is accepted, while more general contracts
may allow the employer to exercise discretion after acceptance; such contracts are
called menu-contracts. I show when the employer can obtain strictly higher expected
payoffs by offering menu-contracts than by offering the restricted contracts used in
i
the literature.
The final model studies the ability of a bidder in an auction to organize collu-
sion among her rival bidders and the resulting impact of this collusion on the seller.
Bidders valuations are private information. I show that in a two bidder, discrete,
independent private-value auction, the seller earns less when a bidder can offer her
rival a collusion proposal than in the absence of collusion. This contrasts with a cele-
brated result by Che and Kim [1] stating that for such auctions there is a mechanism
that eliminates all the effects of collusion. Che and Kim and much of the literature
assume an uninformed third-party organizes collusion.
Key Words: information acquisition, informed principal, auctions, collusion,
mechanism design
JEL Classification: D44, D82, D83, D86, C78
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Introduction
The problem of an individual bargaining with private information is well known to be
relevant to countless economic circumstances such as franchising, vertical contracting,
public procurement, auctions and managerial compensation (see Maskin and Tirole [2]
and Segal and Whinston [4]). On the other hand, such problems are technically
challenging; even in its simplest manifestation, where one player has all the bargaining
power, difficult issues arise (Myerson [3]). While a few notable works have tackled
this problem, there remains significant gaps in the theoretical literature about how
privately informed individuals behave when they have the power to shape their trading
environment.
This thesis fills in some of these gaps. In the first chapter I consider a principal-
agent model in which the principal decides how much private information to acquire
before making an offer to the agent. I prove that for non-trivial parameters of the
model it is strictly suboptimal for the principal to be completely informed. The
intuition is that to convince the agent that she is contracting honestly given her
private information, the principal may need to distort the allocation. This distortion
can be very costly ex ante. Choosing to be partially ignorant frees the principal
from these incentive constraints and partially mitigates the damage to her ex ante
payoff. In much of the relevant literature the principal is assumed to be endowed
with a fixed set of information; this chapter demonstrates that this assumption may
1
be undesirable. Within the small literature that does study the principal’s incentives
to acquire information, this chapter is the first work to take a mechanism design
approach to the problem in a general environment. This generality is important since
it allows the principal to make full strategic use of any information she acquires.
In the next chapter, I expand on this last point and in so doing highlight a potential
oversight in the literature. In particular, I present a model where an employer has
private information about the potential productivity of a worker in a specific task,
who in turn has private information about the effort she exerts on the job. For
example, consider a law firm which has advanced knowledge about the likelihood of
winning a trial and needs to assign an attorney to the case. Suppose further that
the law firm cannot observe the effort the attorney exerts for the case. Much of the
literature on this subject restricts the employer to offer contracts that leave her no
discretion once a contract is accepted, while more general mechanisms may allow the
employer to exercise discretion after acceptance. Such contracts are called menu-
contracts. For example, the law firm may be restricted to paying a wage based on
the only observable outcome: whether the trial is won or lost. On the other hand,
she could in addition specify bonuses to be paid that depend on the difficulty of the
case. In this chapter I describe the advantages to the employer of presenting the
worker with a set of potential contracts from which the employer will choose after the
worker has accepted the offer. Specifically, in a two-state principal-agent model with
moral hazard, I characterize environments in which the employer can obtain strictly
higher expected payoffs by offering menu-contracts than the restricted contracts of
the literature.
In the final chapter I study collusion by bidders in an auction. I depart from
most of the literature by supposing that one of the bidders can propose the collusion
contract. The standard approach to modelling collusion is to assume the collusion
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mechanism is designed by an uninformed third party whose mandate is to maximize a
weighted sum of the bidder’s expected surplus. This construction avoids the informed
principal problem but obscures a number of issues that are important to the modelling
of collusion; in particular, the strategic consideration of the bidder who proposes
collusion as well as the limitations or advantages that are present for the proposer
due to her private information (i.e. her valuation of the good). Within the third party
collusion framework, the literature has shown that if bidders can collude only after
agreeing to participate in the auction, then the seller can design the auction such that
her payoff is no less than if the bidders could not collude at all (see Che and Kim [1]).
In contrast, in this chapter I present an example in a bidder-led collusion framework
such that any appropriately refined equilibrium results in the seller receiving strictly
less than the payoff she would expect if bidders could not collude. Further, I develop
a framework to study the general mechanism design problem of the seller who faces
bidders who can self-organize collusion.
3
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Chapter 1
The Strategically Ignorant
Principal
1.1 Introduction
The problem of a privately informed principal contracting with an agent is known
to be relevant to many real world situations, as noted by Akerlof [1], Myerson [13],
Maskin and Tirole [10, 11] and Segal and Whinston [17]. For example, an insurer
may know more than the client about the risks she faces, or a franchiser may have
private access to data about demand in the territory of a franchisee. As observed in
this literature, a privately informed principal’s payoff can be constrained by her need
to convince the agent that she is contracting honestly, which can require inefficient
contracts (c.f. Akerlof [1] and Maskin and Tirole [11]).
This chapter studies the advantages to the principal of bypassing these constraints
by making the strategic choice to be ignorant. I consider a standard principal-agent
model and extend it by allowing the principal to costlessly learn about the state
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before making an offer to the agent.1 Importantly, I allow the principal to offer
a menu of contracts from which she chooses one to implement after the agent has
accepted (a` la Segal and Whinston [17]).2 This approach favours the acquisition
of information; by contrast, the simpler alternative of the point-conrtact leaves the
principal no discretion once a contract is accepted and thus subjects her to the agent’s
arbitrary off-path posterior beliefs which can deter her from exploiting her private
information. For example, very inefficient contracts can be supported in equilibrium
by punishing deviations from said contracts with agent’s beliefs that put probability
1 on the worst possible state. Despite giving the principal full strategic flexibility to
exploit her information, I prove that there are nontrivial sets of preferences and prior
beliefs such that it is strictly suboptimal for the principal to acquire full information.
This holds even if an informed principal can choose the continuation equilibrium she
most desires.
In my framework, both the principal and the agent care about the state of the
world and all choices, including the information acquisition choice, are observable.
Formally, I study a static adverse selection model with common values as in Maskin
and Tirole [11]. I relax the observability of the information choice in Section 1.6.
My first result, Theorem 1.1, proves under general conditions that there are always
preferences such that the distortions required to make the menu offer incentive com-
patible are so severe that for nontrivial priors the principal finds it strictly suboptimal
to be fully informed, regardless of continuation equilibria following any information
acquisition choice.3 This results holds despite the fact that information is free in our
1I use the terminology of the literature by naming the actor that makes offers the principal while
the actor who responds the agent. The principal is labelled as such because she controls mechanism
to be played and the opposing party must accept this choice passively. A more informative, though
less standard, label for the agent may be the subordinate as used in Myerson [13].
2Menu contracts are fully general trading mechanisms due to the revelation principle.
3My strategic ignorance result is not to be confused with Myerson’s [13] inscrutability principle.
Myerson notes that the principal can never be worse off by not revealing private information when
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model and would thus hold a fortiori under the more realistic assumption that it is
costly to acquire information.
While the proof of this strategic ignorance result is technically complicated, the
intuition is straightforward. I choose preferences for the principal such that the
difference in payoff functions between two adjacent states is small. This creates an
incentive for the principal to lie in one of these states, requiring distortion in the menu-
contract to maintain the principal’s incentive compatibility. The principal prefers to
be uninformed in order to avoid this distortion ex ante. For tractability, this theorem
is based on a set of priors under which the equilibrium payoff of the fully informed
principal’s continuation game is uniquely the lower bound equilibrium payoff of the
game. Its formal proof and those of subsequent results are presented in the Appendix.
I next ask the question of whether ignorance can be an optimal strategy when
there are other equilibria in the fully informed principal’s continuation game that
deliver payoffs greater than the lower bound. In the general case, only these lower
bound payoffs can be computed; to establish the entire set of expected equilibrium
payoffs I specialize to a quasilinear, binary state environment in Section 1.4. I go
beyond Theorem 1.1 to prove not only that the answer to this next question is yes,
but that ignorance is optimal for nontrivial set of parameters of the model even when
the principal expects to attain her highest ex ante payoff conditional on becoming
informed. Thus, ignorance can be optimal even when the principal has a nontrivial
opportunity to choose which equilibrium is played, a` la Myerson [13]. Moreover, I
prove that the restrictions on preferences needed for Theorem 1.1 to hold are com-
patible with quasilinearity, and provide more precise restrictions on the preferences
and priors for which the ignorance result holds.
offering her menu of contracts (thus remaining inscrutable to the agents at this stage), whereas our
result claims that foregoing the acquisition of private information can strictly improve payoffs.
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In Section 1.5 I consider the three state case to examine the subtleties of the
model when the principal is no longer restricted to being either fully informed or
completely uninformed. I prove that complete ignorance is optimal for the principal in
a nonempty open set of priors for nontrivial preferences when there are three states of
the world.4 More generally, I characterize the optimal information acquisition choice
depending on preferences and priors.
Finally, I show that when the information choice of the principal is not observed
by the agent, there is still a nontrivial set of parameters of the model under which
ignorance is chosen with positive probability in equilibrium.
1.1.1 Related Literature
The seminal work on the informed principal problem asks whether and how the
principal can exploit her informational asymmetry (Myerson [13]; Maskin and Ti-
role [10, 11]). These papers endow the principal with information and do not consider
her decision to acquire it.
Since, a handful of papers have looked at the principal’s information acquisition
problem. Nosal [15] and Cre´mer [5] study finite horizon principal-agent problems
in which a principal can acquire information before offering a contract. In both
papers, the information acquired by the principal becomes public before the contract
is implemented; the principal therefore does not face the same distortionary incentive
compatibility constraints that drive our results. Finkle [7] also studies the information
acquisition decision of a principal. His principal covertly acquires private information
for a cost after a contract has been signed but before the contract is implemented.
Finkle considers only contracts that induce full information acquisition. My focus
4This result is nontrivial since there is always a nonempty open set of priors such that com-
plete knowledge is optimal for any preferences and there are always preferences such that complete
knowledge is optimal for all priors.
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is different since I am concerned about how distortionary contracts can be improved
upon by acquiring less than perfect information.
A number of recent papers study the informed principal problem in other environ-
ments. With multiple agents with stochastically dependant (privately known) types,
Severinov [18] provides a construction that allows a privately informed principal to
extract all social surplus. Thus, in this environment, the principal always wishes
to obtain as much information as possible. Mylovanov and Tro¨ger [14] focus on a
linear, independent private values environment. In contrast to our common values
environment, the principal can never lose by having private information but Mylo-
vanov and Tro¨ger determine when the principal is not strictly better off than when
her information is public.
Particularly related to the current chapter, Silvers [19], Kaya [8], Chade and Sil-
vers [4], and Beaudry [2] study the value of the principal’s private information in
games with moral hazard and identify parameters when the principal prefers to be
ignorant. While I focus on pure adverse selection and do not consider moral hazard, I
provide a deeper consideration of the incentives for a principal to acquire information.
In each case, these authors restrict the principal to offer only point-contracts to the
agent, which leaves her no discretion once a contract is accepted. In contrast I allow
the principal to offer menu-contracts, which are fully general trading mechanisms in
our framework. By Myerson’s inscrutability principle, menu-contracts allow the prin-
cipal to reveal no information until the agent has accepted the contract then reveal the
state afterwards. This is more than a matter of technical generality. Menu-contracts
preserve the strategic nature of the informed principal problem captured in the sem-
inal work by Myerson [13] and Maskin and Tirole [10, 11], giving the principal the
best opportunity to capitalize on her informational advantage. Moreover, a restric-
tion to point-contracts can be used to exploit mistrust in the trading relationship by
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using pessimistic posteriors to support very inefficient equilibria, thus increasing the
relative value of ignorance. Allowing the principal to offer menu-contracts eliminates
these mistrustful equilibria from the game.5
1.2 An Example
The following example illustrates the main results of this chapter as well as demon-
strates the importance of considering fully general menu-contracts instead of simpler
point-contracts.
Consider a car manufacturer (the principal) who is negotiating the sale of cars
produced via a new production process to a dealership (the agent) who then resells the
cars to consumers. Suppose there is some uncertainty in the new production process
about how effectively paint can be applied to the cars: in state 1, the standard paint
does not adhere properly and requires an additive that is only effective with black
paint; in state 2, the standard paint can be applied successfully in the manufacturing
process, allowing cars to be painted in any colour. Using the additive raises the cost of
painting each car and the lack of variety reduces the demand for the car. Formally, in
state i the cost to the manufacturer of producing y units of the good is Ci(y) := ciy
with 0 < c2 < c1 < 8; in state 1, the downstream inverse demand for the car is
P 1(y) := 8 − y while in state 2 it is P 2(y) := 9 − y. Thus, given contract (y, t),
the payoff to the manufacturer in state i is V i(y, t) = t− ciy while the payoff to the
dealership is W i(y, t) = P i(y)y − t. Let pi be the common prior belief that the state
5The importance of allowing more general mechanisms here is analogous to the work of Segal
and Whinston [17]. By generalizing offers in a family of bilateral contracting games to allow for
menu contracts, these authors are able to make robust predictions about the game in the sense
that they must be satisfied by all equilibria in all such games. Whether restricting the principal to
point-contracts has bite depends on the specific environment. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation I
characterize moral hazard environments where the principal can get strictly higher ex ante payoffs
when allowed to use more general mechanisms.
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of the world is 1.
Consider the case where the manufacturer is informed of the state of the world
and suppose the manufacturer can only offer a point-contract: a single pair (y, t). A
restriction to point contracts admits very low payoff equilibria for the manufacturer in
the contracting game described above. Consider first an extreme example where the
dealership is highly mistrustful of the manufacturer and rejects any offer that would
give her negative payoff in at least one state of the world. Formally, she believes
the state is 1 with probability 1 for any offer (y, t) such that P 1(y)y − t < 0 and
maintains her prior belief pi otherwise. The optimal equilibrium point-contract for the
manufacturer given these beliefs is
(
yPC , tPC
)
=
(
8−c1
2
,
(
8− 8−c1
2
)
8−c1
2
)
regardless of
the state. Note that
(
yPC , tPC
)
gives the dealership zero payoff in state 1 and strictly
positive payoff in state 2.
The game where the manufacturer can offer point-contracts has other equilibria,
some of which are better for her than the one described above. For example, there is
an equilibrium where the manufacturer offers
(
yLCS1 , t
LCS
1
)
:=
(
8−c1
2
,
(
8− 8−c1
2
)
8−c1
2
)
in state 1 and
(yLCS2 , t
LCS
2 ) := argmax
(y,t)
{
t− c2y : V 1(yLCS1 , tLCS1 ) ≥ V 1(y, t), P 2(y)y = t
}
(1.1)
in state 2. This is the least-cost separating equilibrium and is the best equilibrium
for the manufacturer when she can only offer point-contracts.
Now consider the case where the manufacturer can offer menu-contracts. A menu-
contract is a list of point-contracts offered to the dealership that gives the manufac-
turer the discretion to choose which contract to implement after the dealership has
accepted. I will show that the ability to offer menu-contracts eliminates highly in-
efficient outcomes such as (yPC , tPC). In fact, menu-contracts guarantee that the
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manufacturer’s payoff is at least as high as in the least-cost separating equilibrium.
To see this, suppose the manufacturer offers the menu
{(
yLCS1 , t
LCS
1
)
,
(
yLCS2 , t
LCS
2
)}
in both states the world. This menu is acceptable to the manufacturer regardless of
her belief : it gives her non-negative payoff in each state of the world, assuming the
manufacturer chooses optimally from the menu. Since we have imposed an incentive
compatibility constraint for the manufacturer, this assumption is valid.6 Thus, the
manufacturer can always offer this menu-contract and obtain its payoff. It therefore
provides a lower bound on the payoff the manufacturer expects to earn when she is
able to offer menu-contracts. This menu-contract is called the Rothchilds-Stiglitz-
Wilson (RSW) menu-contract.7 It is introduced by Maskin and Tirole [11, p11] and
it plays a important role in our analysis below. I present its technical definition and
discuss its significance in Section 1.3.
I will now determine when the manufacturer prefers to learn the state of her
production process and when she would rather be uninformed. Let c1 = 4 and
c2 = 2.9. First note that the production efficient level of the good (i.e. the level that
equates marginal revenue with marginal cost) is 2 in state 1 and 3.05 in state 2.
The informed manufacturer’s problem potentially has multiple equilibria depend-
ing on priors which can give her higher payoffs than the RSW menu. Neverthe-
less, we will start with the RSW lower bound menu. The RSW menu is given by
{(2, 12), (4, 20)} and gives expected payoff
4pi + 8.4(1− pi). (1.2)
Notice that the production level of 4 in state 2 is inefficiently high: marginal cost
6See problem (1.1).
7Rothchild-Stiglitz-Wilson is a reference to the similar least cost separating contracts developed
in the insurance models of Rothschild and Stiglitz [16] and Wilson [21].
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is greater than marginal revenue; because the manufacturer’s incentive constraint is
violated at the efficient state 2 production level, production in this state must be
increased so that the constraint just binds. State 1 production is always efficient
because the manufacturer will never want to pretend to be in state 1 when it is state
2 (i.e. the downward incentive constraint for the manufacturer will never bind). Since
the dealership gets zero rents regardless of how much information the manufacturer
has acquired, the value of information for the manufacture, given the RSW payoff is
earned when the state is learned, is decreasing in the production distortion of state
2. A smaller difference between the marginal cost of production in the two states
generates bigger distortions in state 2 and therefore reduces the value of information
for the manufacturer.
Meanwhile, the uninformed manufacturer solves the problem
max
(y,t)
{t− (4pi + 2.9(1− pi))y | (8pi + 9(1− pi)− y)y − t ≥ 0}.
The value of this problem is
(
4pi + 6.1(1− pi)
2
)2
. (1.3)
Expression (1.3) is strictly greater than (1.2) if and only if pi < 0.82. So ignorance is
preferred when the manufacturer expects the RSW menu to be played in equilibrium
as long as the prior is below a cut-off value. This is because the inefficiency in the
RSW menu occurs only in state 2; the manufacturer has to expect that state 2 is
sufficiency likely to occur to prefer ignorance.
Depending on priors, other menu-contract equilibria can exist that give higher
payoffs to the informed manufacturer ex ante. In particular, in Section 1.4 we charac-
terize the highest payoff the informed manufacturer can expect. Although the details
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are beyond the scope of this section, one can show that being ignorant of the state
delivers strictly higher payoffs for the manufacturer ex ante than any equilibrium
menu-contract if and only if pi ∈ (0.62, 0.82).
I have discussed why this interval has an upper cut-off. To understand the lower
bound on this interval consider that for low pi the manufacturer can mitigate the
inefficiency in state 2. Myerson’s [13] inscrutability principle states that we can
assume without loss of generality that the manufacturer offers the same menu in
both states of the world. This implies that dealership evaluates the menu offer using
her prior belief: i.e. she accepts the offer if and only if her participation constraint is
satisfied on average:
pi[(8− y1)y1 − t1] + (1− pi)[(9− y2)y2 − t2] ≥ 0. (1.4)
Now suppose we set y2 to be efficient and at the same time increase t1 and decrease
t2 until the manufacturer’s incentive constraint is just satisfied. When we do this, the
first term of (1.4) becomes negative but the second term becomes positive. For small
enough pi, (1.4) will be satisfied and the dealership will accept the menu. Meanwhile,
the manufacturer earns the full expected trade surplus at this prior and therefore
chooses to become informed.8 As pi increases, eventually full efficiency will not be
attainable. In this example, when pi = 0.62, it is just low enough that the closest the
manufacturer can get to the efficient y2 generates ex ante payoffs that are equal to
the uninformed manufacturer’s payoff.
Finally, in this example the highest payoff the informed manufacturer can achieve
under point-contracts is the RSW payoff, by definition the least cost separating equi-
8While it is true that for small pi the uninformed level of production is close to efficient, it will
never reach full efficiency as long as pi is positive. Since full efficiency is possible through the menu-
contract constructed as described, being informed always dominates not being informed at these low
levels of pi.
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librium.9 For pi < 0.82, even this payoff is less than the uninformed equilibrium payoff
(1.3). In contrast, we can show that if c2 < 2.73 (with c1 = 4), there exists at least
one menu-contract for any prior such that it is better to be informed. Thus, if we
were only to look at point-contracts in this case (with c2 < 2.73 and low enough pi)
we would conclude that the principal has a negative value of information whereas this
value can be positive when menu-contracts are allowed.
1.3 The Model and Suboptimality of Full Informa-
tion
The state space is N = {1, . . . , n} for n < ∞. The game proceeds in four stages.
First, the principal makes an information acquisition choice: a partition of the state
space. This choice is observable and verifiable and the principal privately observes
the partition cell to which the state belongs. There is no cost associated with the
information choice. Second, she offers a menu of contracts. Third, the agent accepts
or rejects the offer. Rejection leaves all parties with zero payoff. Acceptance leads to
the final stage where the principal chooses a contract from the menu and said contract
is implemented. The principal and agent can commit to the menu-contract which the
agent accepted.
A contract specifies an action-transfer pair (y, t) ∈ R2. In state i ∈ N , when
contract (y, t) is implemented, the principal earns payoff V i(y, t) and the agent earns
payoff W i(y, t). I follow the notational convention of Maskin and Tirole [11] by having
superscripts on payoff functions indicate the state. Both functions V i and W i are
continuously differentiable and concave in (y, t). Function V i is increasing in t and
9It can be shown that no pooling equilibrium can ever be sustained: the state 1 manufacturer
will always wish to deviate.
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decreasing in y while W i is increasing in y and decreasing in t. In addition, W i is
increasing in state i for almost all (y, t). I make no explicit assumptions about the
principal’s preferences over states although item (iii) in Assumption 1.1 below puts
some structure over how the principal’s marginal rates of substitution varies by state.
Both parties are expected utility maximizers.
I adopt the following standard sorting assumption on preferences from Maskin
and Tirole [11]. Subscripts on payoff functions denote partial derivatives: V iy (y, t) =
∂V i(y, t)/∂y, V it (y, t) = ∂V
i(y, t)/∂t with agent’s marginal payoffs defined analo-
gously.
Assumption 1.1 (Sorting) (i) W iy(y, t) ≥ 0 for all (y, t) ∈ R2 and there is an
 > 0 such that V iy (y, t) < −, V it (y, t) > , W it (y, t) < − for all i ∈ N and all
(y, t) ∈ R2;
(ii) for all numbers w¯ and v¯ there exists a finite solution to the problem maxV i(y, t)
subject to v¯ ≥ V i(y, t) and W i(y, t) ≥ w¯.
(iii) −V iy (y, t)/V it (y, t) > −V jy (y, t)/V jt (y, t) for all i < j ∈ N and all (y, t) ∈ R2.
In this framework, the menu contracts described above are direct revelation mecha-
nisms: a list of n contracts {(yi, ti)}ni=1 such that the principal offers the menu-contract
in stage two of the game and chooses a contract from the menu to implement in stage
four of the game. Due to the revelation principle, menu-contracts are fully general
trading mechanisms.
An important menu-contract in the informed principal game is the RSW menu.10
Introduced by Maskin and Tirole [11, p11], it generates the lower bound payoff for
the informed principal and it plays a large role in our analysis below. I now present
its technical definition then provide intuition about why it is the principal’s lower
10RSW is an acronym for Rothchild-Stiglitz-Wilson. See footnote 7.
16
bound payoff.
Definition 1.1 The RSW payoff for the principal in state j is the principal’s lower
bound payoff in that state. It is attained by solving the problem
V jr := max{(yk,tk)}k∈N
V j(yj, tj)
s.t. (RSW-IC[l,k]) V l(yl, tl) ≥ V l(yk, tk) for all l, k ∈ N ; and
(RSW-IR[k]) W k(yk, tk) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ N .
Denote by
(
yrj , t
r
j
)
the state j principal’s contract in her solution to this problem. Let
{(yrk, trk)}k∈N denote the menu such that each (yrk, trk) solves the RSW problem for all
k ∈ N .
The RSW problem generates lower bound payoffs for the principal in state j since
the agent will accept any RSW menu regardless of her belief about the state of the
world.11 To see this, note first that the RSW problem for the principal in state j
specifies an entire menu: a contract for each state k ∈ N . This menu must be
incentive compatible in every state k ∈ N , not just state j. Finally, this menu must
guarantee the agent her reservation payoff ex post in every state. Thus, the agent will
always accept an RSW menu. The principal in any state j ∈ N can always deviate
to her RSW menu and get payoff V jr .
12
Theorem 1.1 Suppose Assumption 1.1 holds. Then, for any set of payoffs (W 1, . . . ,W n)
for the agent, there are payoffs functions (V 1, . . . , V n) for the principal and a nonempty
open set of priors such that for any priors in this set, the principal finds it strictly
11In terms of Myerson [13], any feasible solution to the RSW problem is safe. The RSW menu
for the principal in state j is the best safe menu in state j.
12For further discussion of RSW menus and a general characterization of equilibrium menus in
this framework, see Maskin and Tirole [11]
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suboptimal to be fully informed regardless of the continuation equilibria (in pure strate-
gies) following information acquisition.
The formal proof of this theorem and all subsequent results appear in Section
1.8. To prove this theorem, we restrict priors such that within the restricted set
the equilibrium payoff of the fully informed principal’s continuation game is uniquely
the RSW payoff. That is, under the set of priors referred to in the theorem, the
principal’s payoff when fully informed is unique and is her lower bound payoff for
the fully informed continuation game. In the next section we show that the strategic
ignorance result holds when there are multiple equilibria with payoffs that are greater
than the RSW payoff for the principal in all states.
1.4 Strategic Ignorance Despite Multiple Equilib-
ria
In this section we specialize to the quasilinear, binary state environment. Here, we
are able to characterize the entire set of equilibrium payoffs. I therefore go beyond
Theorem 1.1 to prove that ignorance can be optimal even when there exist equilibrium
payoffs higher than the RSW lower bound, and in particular that ignorance is optimal
for nontrivial parameters of the model even when the principal expects to attain her
highest ex ante payoff conditional on becoming informed. This is shown in Theorem
1.2. Thus ignorance can be optimal even when principal can choose from among
multiple equilibria, conditional on being informed, via persuasion over the agent’s
beliefs (a` la Myerson [13]).
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1.4.1 Preferences and Supplemental Assumptions
Let n = 2. Given contract (y, t), the principal gets payoff V i(y, t) = t − Ci(y) for
i ∈ {1, 2} and the agent gets payoff W i(y, t) = U i(y) − t. Let MC i := dCi/dy and
MU i := dU i/dy for all i ∈ {1, 2}. I will refer to Ci as the principal’s cost in state i
and U i as the agent’s revenue in state i.
I assume these payoff functions have the same properties as defined in the Intro-
duction and satisfy Assumption 1.1. I make the following further assumptions on the
principal’s cost function.
Assumption 1.2 For all states i ∈ {1, 2}: (i) Ci is strictly decreasing in i for all
y 6= 0; and (ii) dMCi(·)/dy is nondecreasing in i.
Item (i) says that the principal and the agent agree about which state is the good
state.13 Item (ii) ensures that the RSW contract is unique and deterministic. For
example, Ci(y) = y2 − iy + 2− i satisfies all our assumptions for y > 0.
Since an information choice is a partition of the state space, for n = 2 the principal
is either fully informed or completely ignorant. If the principal chooses not to learn
the state, the offer in stage two is a single contract. Define pi := pi1 as the probability
that the state is 1. In this case, the contract is the solution to the uninformed
principal’s problem:
Vu(pi) := max
(y,t)
{
t− piC1(y)− (1− pi)C2(y) | piU1(y) + (1− pi)U2(y)− t ≥ 0} . (1.5)
An equilibrium consists of an information acquisition choice (either ignorance or
knowledge) together with a contract for each known state and a list of accept/reject
decisions from the agent corresponding to any information choice and menu offered
13This eases incentive compatibility requirements relative to the case where they disagree. I
therefore expect the results to carry over to the latter case.
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such that the information strategy, the offer, and list of the agent’s decisions constitute
a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Define
κ := sup
y
MC1(y)/MC2(y) > 1.
The parameter κ measures the severity of distortions needed in an informed principal’s
menu to maintain incentive compatibility as a function of preferences.
1.4.2 Ignorance and the Best Ex Ante Informed Payoff
The following problem delivers the highest equilibrium payoff the principal can ex-
pect ex ante conditional on becoming informed. The ex ante optimal informed
principal’s problem is
V ∗(pi) := max
{(yi,ti)}i∈{1,2}
∑
i∈{1,2}
pii
(
ti − Ci(yi)
)
(1.6)
s.t. (IC[i, j]) ti − Ci(yi) ≥ tj − Cj(yj) for all i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}
(IR)
∑
i∈{1,2}
pii
(
U i(yi)− ti
) ≥ 0
(NB[i]) ti − Ci(yi) ≥ V ri for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
The constraints NB[i] for i ∈ N are the non-blocking constraints. They state that the
informed principal cannot commit to a contract that gives her a payoff lower than
her RSW payoff in any state. Maskin and Tirole’s [11, p19] Theorem 1 proves that
these constraints form sufficient and necessary conditions for a menu-contract to be
an equilibrium.
Next, we define an ordering for menus among the principal in different states. One
menu is superior to another if it delivers strictly higher payoff to the principal in at
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least one state and at least as high a payoff in the other.
Definition 1.2 A menu {(yi, ti)}i∈N is superior to another menu {(y′i, t′i)}i∈{1,2}
if ti − Ci(yi) ≥ t′i − Ci(y′i) for all i ∈ {1, 2} and there exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that
tj − Cj(yj) > t′i − Cj(y′j).
Our main result of this section says that there exist preferences such that even
when the principal expects to earn V ∗ and that payoff is superior to her RSW payoff,
she will still wish to remain ignorant of the state for a nontrivial set of priors.
Theorem 1.2 Suppose Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. If κ is sufficiently close to
1, there exists a nonempty, open interval of priors such that, for any priors in this
interval, the principal is uninformed regardless of the continuation equilibrium played
following information acquisition and there are multiple continuation equilibria fol-
lowing information acquisition that are superior to the informed principal’s RSW
lower bound.
In particular, for any preferences and priors pi specified in the theorem, choosing to
be ignorant delivers strictly higher payoff than becoming informed and earning payoff
V ∗(pi).
To discuss the intuition of Theorem 1.2 we define the first best menu of contracts.
Definition 1.3 Let action yEi be called efficient in state i ∈ {1, 2} if MC(yEi ) =
MU(yEi ). A menu is first best if it is efficient in both states. Define
V FB(pi) := pi
(
U1(yE1 )− C1(yE1 )
)
+ (1− pi) (U2(yE2 )− C2(yE2 ))
to be the value of the first best menu to the principal ex ante.
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Figure 1.1 illustrates the following intuition behind Theorem 1.2. I show in Lemma
1.9 in Section 1.8.2 that when κ is close to 1, RSW-IC[1,2] binds and as a result yr2 >
yE2 . The RSW menu in the continuation game following full information acquisition
is thus distorted away from the first best. For low pi (lower than piFB in Figure
1.1), the menu that solves problem (1.6) can completely mitigate this inefficiency and
the principal can attain the first best payoff ex ante. As pi increases, however, this
become impossible to do and V ∗ eventually settles to the RSW lower bound payoff
Vr(pi) := piV
1
r + (1− pi)V 2r . I label this point pir.
In Proposition 1.1 (to follow), we show that there exists preferences and pi∗ ≤ 1
such that Vu(pi) > Vr(pi) for all priors pi ∈ (0, pi∗): ignorance generates a higher
payoff than the expected RSW payoff for the principal. This can be seen in Figure
1.1. Further, in Proposition 1.2 we show that that V ∗ is continuous and that there
exists preferences such that pir < pi∗. Thus, Vu(pi) − V ∗(pi) < 0 for pi ∈
(
0, piFB
]
and Vu(pi) − V ∗(pi) > 0 for pi ∈ [pir, pi∗). Since both Vu and V ∗ are continuous,
the intermediate value theorem states there must be some pi′ ∈ (piFB, pir) such that
Vu(pi
′) = V ∗(pi′).14 Thus, for pi ∈ (pi′, pir), we have Vu(pi) > V ∗(pi) > Vr(pi): the
statements of Theorem 1.2 hold.
The next proposition establishes the value of the ignorant principal’s problem
(1.5) relative to the ex ante RSW payoff and characterizes this relative value in terms
of preferences and priors.
Proposition 1.1 Suppose Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. If κ is sufficiently close to
1 then there exists pi∗ ∈ (0, 1] such that for any priors pi ∈ (0, pi∗), Vu(pi) > Vr(pi): the
principal strictly prefers her ignorant payoff to her informed ex ante RSW payoff; if
pi ∈ (pi∗, 1), then Vu(pi) < Vr(pi). Moreover, there exists κ such that pi∗ = 1 if κ < κ.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the following intuition behind Proposition 1.1. Figure 1.2(a)
14If there are multiple such pi′, choose the largest.
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Figure 1.1: This figure illustrates Theorem 1.2. Note the nonempty, open set of priors such that
Vu(pi) > V
∗(pi) > Vr(pi).
plots, in (y, t)-space, the informed RSW solution when the informed principal is
constrained by incentive compatibility. It illustrates how the RSW contract en-
tails inefficiently high y in state 2 and efficient y in state 1. To see why the RSW
action is efficient in state 1, note that the principal can offer the menu-contract{(
yE, U(yE)
)
,
(
yE, U(yE)
)}
. It is straight forward to check that this menu is ex post
incentive compatible (i.e. satisfies RSW-IC[1,2] and RSW-IC[2,1]) and is individually
rational for the agent in both states. Thus,
{(
yE, U(yE)
)
,
(
yE, U(yE)
)}
is an RSW
menu for the principal in state 1. Since
(
yE, U(yE)
)
is a tangency point on the agent’s
indifference curve at her reservation utility, it is the unique state contract that gives
the state 1 principal her efficient payoff U1(yE) − C1(yE) and therefore the unique
state 1 contract in the RSW menu. The state 2 contract in the RSW menu is then the
least cost separating equilibrium, as plotted in the figure. The Figure 1.2(b) plots the
functions Vu and Vr when κ is sufficiently close to 1 that the state 2 RSW contract is
inefficient.
Notice that the state i RSW problem is independent of priors; this implies that,
even as the probability of state 2 approaches 1, the value of the RSW problem for the
state 2 principal will be less than the value of the first-best menu. Meanwhile, the
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(a) V i indicates the RSW indifference curve for
the principal in state i.
(b) V E2 := U
2(yE2 )−C2(yE2 ) is the value of the
efficient contract payoff to the principal in state
2.
Figure 1.2: Example of informed principal RSW solution and value function and uninfored value
function when the principal is constrained by incentive compatility
uninformed principal is unburdened by incentive compatibility constraints and her ex
post payoff approaches efficient levels as pi approach 0 and 1. Further, the uninformed
value function is convex in pi. Since Vr is linear in pi, these value functions must
intersect at most twice as a function of pi: once at pi = 1, since the state 1 contract is
always efficient when the principal is informed, and once at some pi ≥ 0. Denote the
first intersection as pi increases from 0 to 1 by pi∗. As Proposition 1.1 asserts, pi∗ > 0
for κ close enough to 1. For all priors pi < pi∗, the uninformed principal’s payoff will
be higher ex ante than the informed principal RSW payoff.
Our next proposition states that there exists preferences and priors such that the
optimal ex ante equilibrium payoff is achieved by being ignorant of the state, even
when the principal expects to attain V ∗ upon becoming informed.
Proposition 1.2 Suppose Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. If κ is sufficiently close to
1 then there exists pir < pi∗ such that for any priors pi ∈ (pir, pi∗), Vu(pi) > V ∗(pi) =
Vr(pi): the unique ex ante optimal informed payoff is the RSW payoff and the unin-
formed principal’s payoff is strictly larger.
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Remark 1 While Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 may appear to be corollaries of Theorem
1.1, they are making stronger statements than such a corollary could make. First,
our assumptions on preferences (i.e. that κ is sufficiently close to 1) restrict only the
second order properties of the payoff functions rather than the entire function as in
Theorem 1.1. Moreover, Theorem 1.1 could not be specific about which priors admit
ignorance as an optimal strategy whereas the results in this section can.
The main task in the proof of Proposition 1.2 is to characterize the ex ante optimal
informed principal problem (1.6). This allows us to prove the existence of pir and,
importantly, that it is strictly less than 1. Further, we show that V ∗ is continuous.
The existence of pir is proved by demonstrating that for high enough pi the state
2 RSW contract cannot be altered at all without violating either the state 1 princi-
pal’s incentive compatibility constraint or the agent’s individual rationality constraint.
Thus, V ∗ must equal the ex ante RSW payoff for such priors. To see this, note that
to improve on the RSW payoff we must reduce yr2 closer to its efficient level: since
the principal gets all gains from trade in the RSW payoff, the only way to increase
her payoff is to increase the gains from trade. Decreasing y2 requires that we deliver
a higher payoff to the state 1 principal to maintain incentive compatibility. Since yr1
is efficient, however, U1 is tangent to C1 at (yr1, t
r
1). This implies that the agent’s
payoff must be less than her reservation value in state 1. I can give the agent a payoff
higher than her reservation value in state 2 as we move y2 closer to y
E
2 to balance out
this state 1 deficit ex ante; if pi is too large, however, we cannot give the agent a high
enough surplus in state 2 to make up for the deficit in state 1 that is required to main-
tain incentive compatibility. I label pir as the prior at which this point is just hit as
pi increases from 0 to 1 and we note that pir < 1 since the state 1 indifference curve is
everywhere steeper than the state 2 indifference curve. Hence, for pi ∈ [pir, 1), we have
V ∗(pi) = Vr(pi). Finally, we can appeal to Proposition 1.1 and choose κ close enough
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to 1 such that pi∗ > pir. Then for pi ∈ (pir, pi∗), we have V ∗(pi) = Vr(pi) < Vu(pi).
The results in this section have so far used the distortionary effects of the incentive
constraints conditional on the principal being informed as a sufficient condition for
ignorance of the state to be of strategic advantage. The final proposition of this
section shows that binding incentive constraints in the menu offered by the informed
principal are also necessary.
Proposition 1.3 If RSW-IC[1,2] does not bind, then ignorance will never be chosen
in equilibrium. Moreover, the informed RSW problem generates the first best menu
and the unique equilibrium payoff for all priors.
1.5 Optimal Information Structure: Three States
In this section we consider the three state case to examine the subtleties of the
model when the principal no longer faces a binary choice of information acquisition.
She can now choose how informed or how ignorant she wishes to be. I show that
complete ignorance of the state is optimal for the principal in a nonempty open set of
priors for nontrivial preferences. More generally, we characterize optimal information
acquisition choice depending on preferences and priors. Further, we find that if the
principal is exogenously restricted to choosing between complete knowledge of the
state or complete ignorance, there are preferences and a nonempty open set of priors
such that complete ignorance is preferred.
1.5.1 General Information Structures
An information choice by the principal consists of any partition of the set N . Let P
be the set of all partitions of N . I will refer to p ∈ P as an information acquisition
option; the ith cell of p is denoted pi and is referred to as an information set. Given
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information acquisition option p, the state space becomes p in a new informed prin-
cipal problem with typical state pi. A choice of information option p generates payoff
functions
Cpi(y) :=
(
1∑
j∈pi pij
)∑
j∈pi
pijC
j(y)
Upi(y) :=
(
1∑
j∈pi pij
)∑
j∈pi
pijU
j(y)
for each information set pi ∈ p. Associated with each p ∈P there is an RSW menu
which we denote the p-RSW menu.15
Our goal is to analyze the optimal information acquisition options in this environ-
ment. As in the case of two states, we use the closeness of the relative marginal costs
between states to measure the severity of the distortions introduced by the incentive
constraints. Since the information acquisition choice is no longer binary, however, we
require a second parameter. The second measures the separateness of the relative
marginal costs between states. Whereas the first provided us with sufficient condi-
tions for ignorance between two states, the second will provide sufficient conditions
for the principal to be informed of the two states. Define the following
κSi := sup
y
MCi(y)
MC i+1(y)
; and (1.7)
κIi := inf
y>yEi
MCi(y)
MC i+1(y)
(1.8)
for all i ∈ N \ {n} where yEi satisfies MU i(yEi ) = MCi(yEi ).
15See Section 1.8.3 for a formal description of the p-RSW menu.
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1.5.2 Three states of the world
Our result in this section identifies sufficient conditions for certain information ac-
quisition strategies to be optimal. Figure 1.3, panels (a) to (c) indicate (the shaded
areas) the priors under which Proposition 1.4 parts (A) to (C) apply respectively in
a 3 dimensional simplex.
Proposition 1.4 Suppose Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. Let ∆3o := {pi ∈ (0, 1)3|
∑
i pii =
1} be the set of non-degenerate priors and p1 = {{1, 2} , {3}} , p2 = {{1} , {2, 3}} ,
p3 = {{1, 2, 3}} , p4 = {{1} , {2} , {3}} , and p5 = {{1, 3} , {2}} .
(A) There exists κ¯S1 > 1 and κ
I
2 such that for κ
S
1 < κ¯
S
1 and κ
I
2 > κ
I
2, there exists
pˆi ∈ ∆3o such that for any
pi ∈
pi′ ∈ ∆3 pi1 ∈ (pi
′
1, 1),
pi′1
pi′1+pi
′
2
∈
(
pˆi1
pˆi1+pˆi2
, 1
)
,
pi′2
pi′2+pi
′
3
∈
(
pˆi2
pˆi2+pˆi3
, 1
)
pi′1 + pi
′
3 ∈ (pˆi1 + pˆi3, 1), pi
′
1
pi′1+pi
′
3
∈
(
pˆi1
pˆi1+pˆi3
, 1
)

the optimal information acquisition option is p1;
(B) There exists κ¯S2 > 1 and κ
I
1 such that for κ
S
2 > κ¯
S
1 and κ
I
1 < κ
I
2, then there exists
pˆi ∈ ∆3o such that for any
pi ∈
pi′ ∈ ∆3 pi
′
2 ∈ (pˆi2, 1), pi
′
2
pi′2+pi
′
3
∈
(
pˆi2
pˆi2+pˆi3
, 1
)
,
pi′1
pi′1+pi
′
2
∈
(
0, pˆi1
pˆi1+pˆi2
)
,
pi′1
pi′1+pi
′
3
∈
(
0, pˆi1
pˆi1+pˆi3
)

the optimal information acquisition option is p2; and
(C) There exists κS1 > 1 and κ
S
2 > 1 such that if κ
S
1 < κ
S
1 and κ
S
2 < κ
S
2 , then there
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exists pˆi ∈ ∆3o such that for any
pi ∈
pi′ ∈ ∆3 pi
′
1 + pi
′
2 ∈ (pˆi1 + pˆi2, 1) , pi′1 ∈ (pˆi1, 1) ,
pi′1
pi′1+pi
′
2
∈
(
pˆi1
pˆi1+pˆi2
, 1
)
, pi′1 ∈ (pˆi1, 1) , pi
′
1
pi′1+pi
′
3
∈
(
pˆi1
pˆi1+pˆi3
, 1
)

the optimal information acquisition option is p3.
(D) There exists κ¯I1 > 1 and κ¯
I
2 > 1 such that if κ
I
1 > κ¯
I
1 and κ
I
2 > κ¯
I
2 then the optimal
information acquisition option is p4. Moreover, there exists pˆi ∈ ∆3o such that if
pi3 ∈ (pˆi3, 1) then the optimal information acquisition option is p4.
(a) p1 optimal information acquisi-
tion option (κS1 close to 1, κ
I
2 large).
(b) p2 optimal information acquisi-
tion option (κS2 close to 1, κ
I
1 large).
(c) p3 optimal information acquisi-
tion option (both κS1 and κ
S
2 close to
1).
(d) Full ignorance preferred to full
knowledge in restricted game (κS1
close to 1, κI2 large).
Figure 1.3: Proposition 1.4 and Corollary 1 are illustrated in this figure. The labels on the vertices
indicate the probability-one state. The dashed lines represent the restrictions on priors stipulated
in the propositions. Panels (a) to(c) demonstrate the priors under which Proposition 1.4 (A), (B),
and (C) apply respectively. Panel (d), indicate priors under which Corollary 1 applies if κS1 close to
1 and κI2 large.
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Notice that information acquisition options p1, p2 and p5 are two-cell partitions. In
the proof of Proposition 1.4, we treat these as two state informed principal problems
to which we can apply Proposition 1.2 to compare their values to the fully ignorant
information acquisition strategy p3 and characterize the priors and preferences under
which they are preferred to p3 or vice versa. This is straightforward for p1 and p2
– they induce preferences that conform to Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 – but to use
Proposition 1.2 on p5 we must first ensure that the payoff functions it generates
conform to Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2. For parts (A) and (C) this is done by restricting
priors such that pi1 is large relative to pi3 so that event {1, 3} is analogous to state 1
in Section 1.4 and for part (B) we restrict priors such that pi1 is small relative to pi3
so that event {1, 3} is analogous to state 2. Comparing the values from these two-cell
partitions to the fully informed information acquisition strategy p4 and characterizing
the priors and preferences under which they are preferred to p4 or vice versa uses
techniques similar to those used to prove Theorem 1.1.
I have no theory to directly compare the value of the two-cell partitions to each
other, or to directly compare the fully informed payoff to the fully ignorant payoff.
To characterize the priors and preferences under which one is preferred to the other
in each case, we use indirect comparisons over which Proposition 1.2 can be used.
Take for example item (A) of Proposition 1.4. I first note that in the continuation
game following information acquisition option p1 is a two state informed principal
game and the p1-RSW menu is first best, given the information acquisition option.
Therefore, by Proposition 1.3, the principal must prefer p1 to the fully ignorant op-
tion p3. Next we characterize priors under which the p4-RSW payoff is the unique
payoff following information acquisition option p4 and the p4-RSW payoff is strictly
lower than any p1 equilibrium payoff using Proposition 1.2; this requires that pi1 is
sufficiently close to 1 and sufficiently larger than pi2 respectively.
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The next two steps compare the value of choosing information acquisition strategy
p1 to p2 and p5 indirectly by comparing the latter values to information acquisition
option p3. The p2-RSW payoff is the unique payoff following information acquisition
option p2 and the p2-RSW payoff is strictly lower than any p3 equilibrium payoff if
pi1 is sufficiently close to 1 and pi2 sufficiently larger than pi3. To use Proposition 1.2
to compare p5 to p3 we need to ensure that p5 conforms to Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2.
This is so if pi1 is sufficiently larger than pi3. Then, applying Proposition 1.2, the
p5-RSW payoff is the unique payoff following information acquisition option p5 and
the p5-RSW payoff is strictly lower than the p3 payoff if pi1 + pi3 is sufficiently close
to 1.
Thus, we have developed a set of restriction on priors such that within this set of
priors, ex ante, the principal knows that if she chooses any information acquisition
option other than p1, she will attain her RSW payoff for that information acquisition
option and this payoff is necessarily less than the payoff to choosing information
acquisition option p1. I note that this intersection is open and nonempty, since any
priors such that pi1 is sufficiently large (but less than 1) and pi2 is sufficiently larger
than pi3 is in this intersection.
In the final result in this section, we present a corollary to Proposition 1.4 where
we consider an environment in which it is technologically infeasible for the principal
to choose any partition of N . In particular, we suppose that she is restricted to
choosing either to acquire full information or no information.
Corollary 1 Suppose the principal was restricted to choose between complete knowl-
edge and complete ignorance. If either κS1 or κ
S
2 is close to 1, (so some ignorance
is desired in the unrestricted game) there is a nonempty set of priors for which the
principal prefers complete ignorance.
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Figure 1.3, panel (d) indicate the priors under which Corollary 1 applies in a 3
dimensional simplex if κS1 close to 1 and κ
I
2 large.
1.6 Information Acquisition as Hidden Action
In this section we examine the case where the principal’s information acquisition
decision is her private information. The problem becomes one of an informed principal
with three states in which one of the states is endogenously chosen by the principal:
the informed principal in each of the two states and the uninformed state of the
principal.
A menu-contract is a list {(y0, t0), (y1, t1), (y2, t2)} where state 0 is the uninformed
state. Let α ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that the principal becomes informed.
Thus, α is the principal’s information acquisition strategy. Finally, define C0(y) :=
piC1(y)+(1−pi)C2(y) to be the expected cost of implementing effort y for the principal
and U0(y) := piU1(y) + (1 − pi)U2(y) to be the expected revenue of effort y for the
agent.
Our first result shows that there is always an equilibrium where the principal is
informed with zero probability.
Lemma 1.1 There always exists an equilibrium with α = 0.
On the other hand, we assert in our next proposition that a payoff equivalent equi-
librium exists in which the principal is uninformed with strictly positive probability
if κ is close enough to 1.
Proposition 1.5 Suppose Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. If κ is sufficiently close to
1, then there exists a nonempty open interval of priors such that the principal remains
ignorant with positive probability.
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As shown in the proof of Lemma 1.1, incentive compatibility ensures that the
payoff to the uninformed principal will never be larger than that of the informed
principal in expectation. To prove Proposition 1.5, we start with an equilibrium
where the principal acquires information with zero probability and construct a payoff
equivalent equilibrium where she acquires information with strictly positive proba-
bility. As long as κ is sufficiently small, there is an interval of priors such that the
contract is inefficient in at least one state. This allows us to increase the agent’s pay-
off while maintaining the principal’s payoff, thus creating a surplus for the agent in
this state. By choosing a sufficiently low but positive α, we can leverage this surplus
to increase the payoff to the uninformed principal sufficiently high to make her indif-
ferent between being informed and being ignorant while maintaining the individual
rationality constraint. The formal construction of the payoff equivalent contract is
demonstrated in the proof.
1.7 Conclusion
I have studied a principal-agent problem where the principal can decide how much
private information to (costlessly) acquire before offering a contract to an uninformed
agent. Importantly, the state is directly payoff relevant to both the principal and the
agent. In this setting I have found that the principal will not choose to be completely
informed of the state for some priors as long as her payoffs between at least two states
of the world are sufficiently close. Indeed, this result holds regardless of the contin-
uation equilibrium played following any information acquisition choice and is robust
to the existence of multiple equilibria in the informed principal continuation game. I
show further, in a three state, quasilinear environment, that the principal chooses to
be completely ignorant of the state for nontrivial parameters of the model. Notably,
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these results were obtained in a full mechanism design framework: the principal was
given full strategic flexibility to make use of whatever information she decides to
acquire.
1.8 Proofs
I assume that incentive compatibility constraints are still imposed at degenerate pri-
ors.
1.8.1 The Suboptimality of Full Information
Proof of Theorem 1.1 Before we prove Theorem 1.1, we first describe how As-
sumption 1.1 simplifies the computation of an RSW menu according to Proposition 2
in Maskin and Tirole [11, p12].
Proposition 2, Maskin and Tirole [11] Suppose Assumption 1.1 holds. The RSW
allocation (within the class of deterministic solutions) is obtained by successively solv-
ing the following programs:
max
(y1,t1)
V 1(y1, t1) (RSW
1)
s.t. (RSW-IR[1]) W 1(y1, t1) = 0
and for all k = 2, . . . , n, given (y1, t1), . . . , (yk−1, tk−1)
max
(yk,tk)
V k(yk, tk) (RSW
k)
s.t. (RSW-IC[k-1,k]) V k(yk−1, tk−1) ≥ V k−1(yk, tk); and
(RSW-IR[k]) W k(yk, tk) = 0
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Further, yk−1 < yk and tk−1 < tk for all k = 2, . . . , n.
Remark 2 Note that, (i) the RSW individual rationality constraints in each state
always bind; (ii) of all the incentive compatibility constraints, only those of the form
RSW-IC[j, j + 1] for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} can possibly bind; (iii) the constraint
RSW-IC[j − 1, j] only shows up in the RSW problem of the principal in state j; (iv)
the choice variable in each state is now a single contract rather than a full menu; and
(v) (yrj , t
r
j) is strictly increasing in the state j.
Let pi ∈ ∆n := {pˆi ∈ [0, 1]n : ∑i∈N pˆii = 1} be the common prior belief over the
state spaceN . I begin by defining two information acquisition options for the principal
(one partially ignorant, one fully informed) and their payoffs. Choose any i ∈ N and
consider:
(a) FI: The full information option reveals the precise state before the contract is
offered;
(b) PI: The partial ignorance option reveals all states precisely unless that state is
either i or i+ 1; if the state is either i or i+ 1, it is only revealed that the state
is in {i, i+ 1}.
I refer to the continuation game following the information acquisition option FI
as the original game and the continuation game following the information acquisition
option PI as the modified game. Our goal is to compare the ex ante RSW payoffs for
each game.
Consider the principal in the interim stage who knows that the state is in {i, i+1};
call her the {i, i+ 1}-state principal. Let
α =
pii
pii + pii+1
.
35
The {i, i+ 1}-state principal’s interim expected payoff from choosing FI is
V
{i,i+1}
FI (α) := αV
i
r + (1− α)V i+1r .
Consider the modified game that treats {i, i + 1} as a single state: the state
space is Nˆ = {1, . . . , i− 1, {i, i+ 1}, i+ 2, . . . , n}, the principal has payoff V j(y, t)
and the agent has payoff W j(y, t) in all states j = 1, . . . , i−1, i+ 2, . . . , n and payoffs
V {i,i+1}(y, t) := αV i(y, t) + (1 − α)V i+1(y, t) and W {i,i+1}(y, t) := αW i(y, t) + (1 −
α)W i+1(y, t) respectively in state {i, i+ 1}, given contract (y, t).
The following lemma establishes the state {i, i+1} RSW problem for the principal
who chooses PI.
Lemma 1.2 The interim expected payoff for the principal from playing PI is repre-
sented by the problem
V i,i+1PI (α) := max
(y,t)
αV i(y, t) + (1− α)V i+1(y, t) (1.9)
s.t αW i(y, t) + (1− α)W i+1(y, t) = 0
V i−1(yri−1, t
r
i−1) ≥ V i−1(y, t).
Proof The result follows from Proposition 2 of Maskin and Tirole [11] if we can
show that the modified game with state space Nˆ = {1, . . . , {i, i+ 1}, . . . , n} satisfies
the associated Sorting Assumption 1.1. In the modified game, we treat the combined
states {i, i+ 1} as a single state.
By inspection, items (i) and (ii) of Sorting Assumption 1.1 are satisfied in the
modified game. For item (iii) we need to show that −V i+2y
V i+2t
< −αV iy+(1−α)V
i+1
y
αV it +(1−α)V i+1t
<
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−V i−1y
V i−1t
.16 Recall that Vt > 0 and Vy < 0. Assumption 1.1 for the original game has
− V
i
y
V it
> −V
i+1
y
V i+1t
⇔ −V iyV i+1t > −V i+1y V it . (1.10)
Then
−αV
i
y + (1− α)V i+1y
αV it + (1− α)V i+1t
=− αV
i
y + (1− α)V i+1y
αV it + (1− α)V i+1t
· V
i+1
t
V i+1t
>
−αV i+1y V it − (1− α)V i+1y V i+1t
αV it + (1− α)V i+1t
· 1
V i+1t
=− V
i+1
y
V i+1t
> −V
i+2
y
V i+2t
(1.11)
where the first inequality follows from inequality (1.10) and the second results from
the Sorting Assumption 1.1. And, by a symmetric argument −αV iy+(1−α)V
i+1
y
αV it +(1−α)V i+1t
< −V i−1y
V i−1t
as needed.
Denote by (y(α), t(α)) the solution to this problem. The following four lemmas
characterize V
{i,i+1}
PI and bound it from below.
Lemma 1.3 V
{i,i+1}
PI (1) = V
i
r .
Proof By Proposition 2 of Maskin and Tirole [11],
V ir = max
(yi,ti)
{
V i(yi, ti) : V
i−1(yri−1, t
r
i−1) ≥ V i−1(yi, ti) and W i(yi, ti) = 0
}
.
Problem (1.9) at α = 1 is
V
{i,i+1}
PI (1) = max
(y,t)
{
V i(y, t) : V i−1(yri−1, t
r
i−1) ≥ V i(y, t) and W i(y, t) = 0
}
due to the previous lemma. These problems are equivalent.
16Recall that the subscripts on the payoff functions indicate partial derivatives.
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Lemma 1.4 The payoff to the information acquisition option PI can be expressed as
V i,i+1PI (α) = V
i
r −
∫ 1
α
(
V i(y(a), t(a))− V i+1(y(a), t(a))) da
−
∫ 1
α
λ(a)
(
W i(y(a), t(a))−W i+1(y(a), t(a))) da.
Proof Consider the optimization problem (1.9). By the integral form of the envelope
theorem (Milgrom and Segal, Corollary 5, [12]), its value is
V
{i,i+1}
PI (α) = V
i+1(y(0), t(0)) +
∫ α
0
(
V i(y(a), t(a))− V i+1(y(a), t(a))) da (1.12)
+
∫ α
0
λ(a)
(
W i(y(a), t(a))−W i+1(y(a), t(a))) da
where λ is the multiplier on the first constraint. Simple algebra on equation (1.12)
shows that
V
{i,i+1}
PI (α) = V
i+1(y(0), t(0)) +
∫ α
0
(
V i(y(a), t(a))− V i+1(y(a), t(a))) da (1.13)
+
∫ 1
0
λ(a)
(
W i(y(a), t(a))−W i+1(y(a), t(a))) da
−
∫ 1
α
λ(a)
(
W i(y(a), t(a))−W i+1(y(a), t(a))) da.
By Lemma 1.3 we can plug V ir in for V
{i,i+1}
PI (1) in equation (1.13) evaluated at α = 1
and rearrange to get
∫ 1
0
λ(a)
(
W i(y(a), t(a))−W i+1(y(a), t(a))) da = (1.14)
V ir − V i+1(y(0), t(0))−
∫ 1
0
(
V i(y(a), t(a))− V i+1(y(a), t(a))) da
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Now plug (1.14) into (1.13) to get
V
{i,i+1}
PI (α) = V
i
r −
∫ 1
α
(
V i(y(a), t(a))− V i+1(y(a), t(a))) da
−
∫ 1
α
λ(a)
(
W i(y(a), t(a))−W i+1(y(a), t(a))) da.
as needed.
Lemma 1.5 Let V denote the set of payoff functions for the principal that satisfy
all our assumptions with typical element V = (V 1, . . . , V n). For any V ∈ V , define
M(α;V ) :=
−V {i,i+1}t (y(α), t(α))
[
V iy (y(α),t(α))
V it (y(α),t(α))
− V i−1y (y(α),t(α))
V i−1t (y(α),t(α))
]
−V i−1y (y(α),t(α))
V i−1t (y(α),t(α))
W
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α)) +W
{i,i+1}
y (y(α), t(α))
,
M(V ) := min
α∈[0,1]
M(α;V ).
Choose small δ > 0 such that V¯ := {V ∈ V : M(V ) > δ} 6= ∅. Then for all V ∈ V¯ ,
λ(α) > δ for any α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof I claim that M(α;V ) is well defined and strictly positive for all α and V . To
see this, note first that by the Sorting Assumption 1.1 the numerator in M(α;V ) is
strictly negative for all α ∈ [0, 1] and V ∈ V . Define
Z(α;V ) = −V
i−1
y (y(α), t(α))
V i−1t (y(α), t(α))
W
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α)) +W
{i,i+1}
y (y(α), t(α))
To see that the Z(α;V ) < 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1] and all V ∈ V suppose by contradiction
that there is some α ∈ [0, 1] and some V ∈ V such that Z(α;V ) ≥ 0. Let µ be
the Lagrange multiplier on the second constraint in problem (1.9). To demonstrate a
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contradiction, consider the Lagrangian for problem (1.9) evaluated at the maximum
L = V {i,i+1}(y(α), t(α)) + λ(α)W {i,i+1}(y(α), t(α))
+ µ(α)
(
V i−1(yri−1, t
r
i−1)− V i−1(y(α), t(α))
)
and the following deviation from the optimal contract (y(α), t(α)): (yˆ, tˆ) := (y(α) +
δy, t(α)+ δt) for small δy, δt > 0 such that V
i−1
y (y(α), t(α))δy+V
i−1
t (y(α), t(α))δt = 0.
By the Sorting Assumption 1.1, part (iii)
−V
i+1
y (y(α), t(α))
V i+1t (y(α), t(α))
< −V
i
y (y(α), t(α))
V it (y(α), t(α))
< −V
i−1
y (y(α), t(α))
V i−1t (y(α), t(α)
=
δt
δy
(1.15)
Cross multiplying and rearranging the (1.15) gives δyV
i
y (y(α), t(α))+δtV
i
t (y(α), t(α)) >
0 and δyV
i+1
y (y(α), t(α)) + δtV
i+1
t (y(α), t(α)) > 0. Taking a convex combination of
these expressions gives (weighting by α and 1− α)
dV {i,i+1}(y(α), t(α)) := δyV {i,i+1}y (y(α), t(α)) + δtV
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α)) > 0
Let Lˆ denote the value of the Lagrangian at the deviation (yˆ, tˆ). The net gain
from the deviation is
Lˆ −L = dV {i,i+1}(y(α), t(α)) + λ(α)
[
δyW
{i,i+1}
y (y(α), t(α)) + δtW
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α))
]
= dV {i,i+1}(y(α), t(α)) + δyλ(α)
[
W {i,i+1}y (y(α), t(α)) +
δt
δy
·W {i,i+1}t (y(α), t(α))
]
= dV {i,i+1}(y(α), t(α)) + δyλ(α)Z(α;V ) > 0
where the third equality follows from the equality in (1.15) and the definition of Z
and the inequality follows since we have assumed Z(α;V ) ≥ 0. If δy, δt are sufficiently
small, the deviation contract (yˆ, tˆ) strictly increases the Lagrangian which contradicts
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the supposition that (y(α), t(α)) is an optimum. Thus, Z(α;V ) < 0 so M(α;V ) > 0
for all α ∈ [0, 1] and V ∈ V and so M(V ) > 0 for all V ∈ V . Thus, V¯ is a nonempty
for sufficiently small δ > 0.
To see that λ(α) > δ for any V ∈ V¯ , suppose there exists V ∈ V¯ such that
λ(α) ≤ δ and consider the same deviation proposed above. Choose any α ∈ [0, 1].
From equality in (1.15)
δyV
i
y (y(α), t(α)) + δtV
i
t (y(α), t(α)) = M(α;V ) · Z(α;V ) ·
[
−V
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α))
δyV it (y(α), t(α))
]−1
= −δyV it (y(α), t(α)) ·M(α;V )
Z(α;V )
V
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α))
and due to the first inequality and the equality in (1.15)
δyV
i+1
y (y(α), t(α)) + δtV
i+1
t (y(α), t(α)) > M(α;V ) · Z(α;V ) ·
[
−V
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α))
δyV
i+1
t (y(α), t(α))
]−1
= −δyV i+1t (y(α), t(α)) ·M(α;V )
Z(α;V )
V
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α))
.
Summing the last two expressions (weighted by α and 1− α) we get
dV {i,i+1}(y(α), t(α)) > −δyM(α;V )Z(α;V )
= −M(α;V )
[
δtW
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α)) + δyW
{i,i+1}
y (y(α), t(α))
]
> −M(V )
[
δtW
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α)) + δyW
{i,i+1}
y (y(α), t(α))
]
> −δ
[
δtW
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α)) + δyW
{i,i+1}
y (y(α), t(α))
]
.
The equality follows from the definition of Z and the equality in (1.15). The last two
inequalities follow since the term in the square brackets is negative.17 Using this last
17Otherwise, the deviation is strictly better for the {i, i + 1} principal, at least a good for the
agent and maintains the incentive compatibility constraint, a contradiction that (y(α), t(α)) is an
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inequality, the gain from deviation is
Lˆ −L = dV {i,i+1}(y(α), t(α)) + λ(α)
[
δyW
{i,i+1}
y (y(α), t(α)) + δtW
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α))
]
> − (δ − λ(α))
[
δyW
{i,i+1}
y (y(α), t(α)) + δtW
{i,i+1}
t (y(α), t(α))
]
≥ 0.
where the final inequality is due to our assumption that δ ≥ λ(α). If δy, δt are
sufficiently small, the deviation contract (yˆ, tˆ) strictly increases the Lagrangian which
contradicts the supposition that (y(α), t(α)) is an optimum. Thus, λ(α) > δ for any
V ∈ V¯ . Since α was chosen arbitrarily, this holds for all α ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 1.6 There exists a ξ > 0 such that for any specification of preferences
W i(y(α), t(α))−W i+1(y(α), t(α)) < −ξ for any α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof Since 0 < yri < y(α) < y
r
i+1 and 0 < t
r
i < t(α) < t
r
i+1 and we assume that W
i
is strictly increasing in i18
W i(y(α), t(α))−W i+1(y(α), t(α)) ≤ max
(y,t)∈[yri ,yri+1]×[tri ,tri+1]
W i(y, t)−W i+1(y, t) < −ξ
as needed.
Lemma 1.7 For any V ∈ V¯ such that ‖V i − V i+1‖∞ < 12δξ, we have for any α ∈
[0, 1), V
{i,i+1}
PI (α) > V
{i,i+1}
FI (α).
optimum.
18The ordering of RSW actions and transfers is stated in Proposition 2 of Maskin and Tirole [11].
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Proof Using Lemma 1.4
V i,i+1PI (α)− V i,i+1FI (α) ≥ (1− α)
(
V i(yri+1, t
r
i+1)− V i+1(yri+1, tri+1)
)
(1.16)
−
∫ 1
α
(
V i(y(a), t(a))− V i+1(y(a), t(a))) da
−
∫ 1
α
λ(a)
(
W i(y(a), t(a))−W i+1(y(a), t(a)) da
> −(1− α)δξ + (1− α)δξ = 0
where the first inequality due to the RSW-IC[i,i+1] constraint, the second holds due
to Lemmas 1.5 and 1.6 and since ‖V i − V i+1‖ < 1
2
δξ.
Lemma 1.8 Let V jr (PI) denote the RSW payoff of the principal in state j 6= {i, i+
1} in the continuation game following information acquisition option PI and let
(yrj (PI), t
r
j(PI)) be the associated RSW contract.
19 Then V jr (PI) ≥ V jr for all
j 6= {i, i+ 1}.
Proof Take j 6= {i, i+ 1}. For j < i, V jr (PI) = V jr due to item (iii) in Remark 2.
I claim that the incentive compatibility constraint in the state j ≥ i+ 2 PI-RSW
problem is weaker than in the state j FI-RSW problem. The argument is illustrated
in Figure 1.4.
If j = i + 2, then the incentive compatibility constraint is weaker. To see this,
define the indifference curve of any principal in state l ∈ N ∪ {i, i + 1} at payoff K
to be t¯l(y;K) such that V l(y, t¯l(y;K)) = K for any y.20 Note that the slope of the
curve t¯l(y;K) with respect to y is −V ly (y, t)/V lt (y, t) and t¯l(y;K) is strictly increasing
in K since V l is strictly increasing in t for all l ∈ N ∪ {i, i+ 1}.
19I have suppressed the dependence of these objects on α for clarity.
20The existence of such a t¯ is guaranteed by the implicit function theorem.
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Figure 1.4: If the original game is incentive compatible, we can replace states i and i + 1 with
{i, i+ 1} and maintain incentive compatibility.
By inequality (1.11) we have
t¯{i,i+1}(y;V {i,i+1}(yri+1, t
r
i+1))

= t¯i+1(y;V i+1r ) if y = y
r
i+1
> t¯i+1(y;V i+1r ) if y > y
r
i+1
< t¯i+1(y;V i+1r ) if y < y
r
i+1
(1.17)
Since yri+2 > y
r
i+1, by the middle line of (1.17) we have
t¯{i,i+1}(yri+2;V
{i,i+1}(yri+1, t
r
i+1)) > t¯
i+1(yri+2;V
i+1
r )) ≥ tri+2 (1.18)
where the last inequality follows since V i+1(yri+1, t
r
i+1) ≥ V i+1(yri+2, tri+2) by the defi-
nition of the RSW menu.
Finally, note that V {i,i+1}(α) ≥ V {i,i+1}(yri+1, tri+1) since (yri+1, tri+1) is a feasible
solution for problem (1.9) for all α ∈ (0, 1). Then, by (1.18)
t¯{i,i+1}(yri+2;V
{i,i+1}(α)) > tri+2
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so that the principal in state {i, i + 1} will not misrepresent the state as i + 2 when
the state i+ 2 principal gets her RSW contract
(
yri+2, t
r
i+2
)
:
V {i,i+1}(α) > αV i(yri+2, t
r
i+2) + (1− α)V i+1(yri+2, tri+2).
Moreover, by the Sorting Assumption 1.1, for j = i+ 2, . . . , n, if we assign to the
state j principal (yrj , t
r
j), the state {i, i+ 1} principal will not misrepresent the state
as j.
Thus, if {(yrk, trk)}k∈N is an RSW menu for the continuation game following the
full information acquisition option, then
{
(yr1, t
r
1), . . . , (y
r
i−1, t
r
i−1), (y(α), t(α)), (y
r
i+2, t
r
i+2), . . . , (y
r
n, t
r
n)
}
is a safe menu: it is incentive compatible and the agent will accept it regardless of
her beliefs.21 Therefore, the RSW payoff in each state for the modified game is at
least as high as that in the original game.
Maskin and Tirole [11] show that there is a nonempty set of priors such that the
RSW payoff
∑
j pijV
j
r is the unique equilibrium payoff when the principal is perfectly
informed of the state. Choose any prior pi′ in this set; pi′ determines some α′. Then,
by Lemma 1.7, for ‖V i − V i+1‖∞ sufficiently small
∑
j
pi′jV
j
r −
[ ∑
j 6=i,i+1
pi′jV
j
r (PI) + (pi
′
i + pi
′
i+1)V
{i,i+1}
PI (α
′)
]
≤
∑
j 6=i,i+1
pi′jV
j
r + (pi
′
i + pi
′
i+1)V
{i,i+1}
FI (α
′)−
[ ∑
j 6=i,i+1
pi′jV
j
r + (pi
′
i + pi
′
i+1)V
{i,i+1}
PI (α
′)
]
= (pi′i + pi
′
i+1)
(
V
{i,i+1}
PI (α
′)− V {i,i+1}FI (α′)
)
< 0.
21Recall that the solution to problem (1.9) requires that the state i − 1 principal not wish to
misrepresent the state as {i, i+ 1}.
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The first term in both lines is the expected (unique) equilibrium payoff for the fully
informed principal. The second term is expected equilibrium payoff if she confounds
states i and i + 1. The first inequality follows from Lemma 1.8, the second from
Lemma 1.7.
1.8.2 Strategic Ignorance Despite Multiple Equilibria
Proof of Proposition 1.1
I begin by showing that if κ is small, the RSW-IC[1,2] binds.
Lemma 1.9 If κ is sufficiently close to 1, then tr1 − C1(yr1) = tr2 − C1(yr2).
Proof By way of contradiction, assume that tr1 − C1(yr1) > tr2 − C1(yr2). Let (yˆ1, tˆ1)
denote the optimal contract for the principal in state 1 when she has convinced the
agent that she is in state 2:
(yˆ1, tˆ1) = arg max
y1,t1
{t1 − C1(y1)|t1 = U2(y1)} (1.19)
This solution is uniquely characterized by MC1(yˆ1) = MU
2(yˆ1) and tˆ1 = U
2(yˆ1. Fur-
ther, the state 1 principal’s RSW contract is characterized by MC1(yr1) = MU
1(yr1)
and tr1 = U
1(yr1) and since RSW-IC[1,2] does not bind, the state 2 principal’s RSW
contract is characterized by MC2(yr2) = MU
2(yr2) and t
r
2 = U
2(yr2). Now,
MC2(yˆ1) <MC
1(yˆ1) = MU
2(yˆ1) = MC
1(yˆ1)
(
MC2(yˆ1)
MC2(yˆ1)
)
≤ κMC2(yˆ1).
So, if κ is close enough to 1, since costs are convex, we can bound the difference
between the two maximizers for some small δa > 0: y
r
2 − yˆ1 < δa. In a similar way,
we can show there exists small δby > 0 such that yˆ1 − yr1 < δb. Thus, we can choose κ
sufficiently close to 1 such that yr2 − y1r < δa + δb and hence C1(yr2)− C1(yr1) < δc :=
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miny{U2(y)− U1(y)}. Then
0 > U2(yr2)− C1(yr2)− [U1(yr1)− C1(yr1)] = U2(yr2)− U1(yr1)−
[
C1(yr2)− C1(yr1)
]
> δc −
[
C1(yr2)− C1(yr1)
]
> 0
where the first inequality follows from the fact that we have assumed RSW-IC[1,2]
does not bind. This is a contradiction so we must have RSW-IC[1,2] bind for κ close
to 1.
Now we characterize payoffs for the ignorant strategy and the informed strategy.
Note that the uninformed principal’s problem (1.5) can be expressed as Vu(pi) =
maxy pi[U
1(y)−C1(y)] + (1−pi)[U2(y)−C2(y)] since IG-IR constraint always binds.
Fix κ such that RSW-IC[1,2] binds. The first statement of Proposition 1.1 re-
sults from the following properties of the payoff functions: (a) V 1r = Vu(1) since the
maximand and constraints are identical in the RSW and uninformed problems at
pi = 1; (b) V r2 < Vu(0) since the state 2 RSW problem is more constrained (i.e. by
RSW-IC[1,2]) than the uninformed principal’s problem at pi = 0 by our choice of κ;
(c) Vu(pi) is convex and downward sloping in pi since the maximand is linear in pi; and
(d) Vr(pi) is linear and downward sloping in pi.
Properties (c) and (d) imply that the equation Vu(pi) = Vr(pi) has at most two
solution. Clearly, one solution is always pi = 1. Due to properties (b) - (d), a second
solution pi∗ > 0 exists and Vu(pi) > Vr(pi) for all pi ∈ (0,min(1, pi∗)).
The following lemma completes the proof of Proposition 1.1.
Lemma 1.10 Fix C1 and U i for i ∈ {1, 2}. There exists κ∗ such that if κ < κ∗, then
Vu(pi) > Vr(pi) for all pi ∈ (0, 1).
Proof Define Si(y) := U i(y)−Ci(y). By the integral form of the envelope theorem
(Milgrom and Segal, [12]) Vu(pi) = Vu(0) +
∫ pi
0
(S1(y(pi))−S2(y(pi)))dpi. As in Lemma
47
1.4 we can write Vu(pi) = V
1
r −
∫ 1
pi
(S1(y(pi))− S2(y(pi)))dpi and so
Vu(pi)− Vr(pi) = (1− pi)(V 1r − V 2r )−
∫ 1
pi
(S1(y(pi))− S2(y(pi)))dpi. (1.20)
Note that
S1(y(pi))− S2(y(pi)) < S1(yr1)− S2(yr1) (1.21)
= V 1r − (U2(yr1)− C2(yr1))
= −(U2(yr1)− U1(yr1))− (C1(yr1)− C2(yr1))
≤ −(U2(yr1)− U1(yr1))−∆C(0).
for all pi ∈ (0, 1) where ∆C(0) = C1(0)−C2(0) is the difference in fixed costs between
states.
Further,
V 1r − V 2r = tr2 − C1(yr2)− (tr2 − C2(yr2)) (1.22)
= −(C1(yr2)− C2(yr2)))
= −
∫ yr2
0
[
MC1(y)−MC2(y)] dy − (C1(0)− C2(0))
≥ −(κ− 1) [C2(yr2)− C2(0)]−∆C(0)
The first equality follows from the fact that tr1 − C1(yr1) = tr2 − C1(yr1).
Now, applying inequalities (1.21) and (1.22) to equation (1.20) we have
Vu(pi)− Vr(pi) ≥ −(κ− 1)
[
C2(yr2)− C2(0)
]−∆C(0) + U2(yr1)− U1(yr1) + ∆C(0)
= −(κ− 1) [C2(yr2)− C2(0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+U2(yr1)− U1(yr1) (1.23)
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The RSW actions yri for all i = 1, 2 will be the same for all κ: both are determined
solely by the cost function of the state 1 principal. The term A in (1.23) can be made
arbitrarily small by taking κ close to 1 since C2(yr2) < C
1(yr2). Moreover, the term
U2(yr1) − U1(yr1) > 0 and does not change with κ. Therefore 3 for κ > 1 sufficiently
close to 1, we have Vu(pi) > Vr(pi) for all pi ∈ (0, 1). Define κ := sup{κ|Vu(pi) >
Vr(pi) for all pi ∈ (0, 1)} > 1.
Proof of Proposition 1.2 I begin by proving three useful lemmas. Then, in
Lemma 1.14, we characterize V ∗. The important fact derived in this lemma is that
the RSW payoff is the unique equilibrium payoff for all pi ∈ [pir, 1) for some pir < 1.
Lemma 1.11 If RSW-IC[i, i + 1] is strictly binding, for any i = 1, . . . , n − 1 (i.e.
tri − Ci(yri ) = tri+1 − Ci(yri+1)) then the state i + 1 RSW contract is inefficient:
MCi+1(yri+1) > MU
i+1(yri+1).
Proof Suppose MCi+1(yri+1) < MU
i+1(yri+1) and consider the following deviation
for type 2 in the RSW problem: y′ = yri+1 + ε; and
t′ ∈ (tri+1 + εMC2(yri+1), tri+1 + εmin{MU2(yri+1),MCi(yri+1)}) .
Then for sufficiently small ε > 0, this deviation is profitable and feasible:
t′ − Ci(y′) < tri+1 − Ci(yri+1) = tri − Ci(yri );
t′ − Ci+1(y′) > tri+1 − Ci+1(yri+1); and
U i+1(y′)− t′ > U i+1(yri+1)− tri+1.
If MCi+1(yri+1) = MU
i+1(yri+1), then RSW-IC[i, i+ 1] is not strictly binding.
Lemma 1.12 If {(yi, ti)}∈N is an equilibrium of the informed principal problem, then
y2 ≤ yr2.
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Proof Suppose y2 > y
r
2. If RSW-IC[1,2] is not binding, then the first best contract
is possible and y2 = y
r
2; this is a contradiction.
If RSW-IC[1,2] is binding, first note that since C1(yr1) is tangent to U
1(yr1) (so
that tr1 = U
1(yr1)), any state 1 contract that satisfies NB
1 must have tr1 ≥ U1(yr1).
By Lemma 1.11, MC2(yr2) > MU
2(yr2). This implies, that since C
2 is convex and
increasing and U2 is concave and increasing, if t2 − C2(y2) ≥ V 1r = U2(yr2) − C2(yr2)
then t2 > U
2(y2) for y2 > y
r
2. But this violates the individual rationality constraint
of the agent, a contradiction that y2 > y
r
2 can occur in equilibrium.
Lemma 1.13 V ∗(pi) is continuous.
Proof Consider the ex ante optimal informed principal’s problem (1.6) and its value
function V ∗(pi). Let y = (y1, y2) and t = (t1, t2). I will show that the feasibility
correspondence
Γ(pi) =
(y, t) ∈ R
4
∣∣∣∣∣
(IC[i, j]) ti − Ci(yi) ≥ tj − Cj(yj) for all i 6= j ∈ N
(IR)
∑
i pii (U
i(yi)− ti) ≥ 0
(NB[i]) ti − Ci(yi) ≥ V ri for all i ∈ N

is both upper and lower hemi-continuous in pi.
Due to Lemma 1.12 and Assumption 1.2, without lost of generality we can restrict
the feasibility correspondence to
Γ′(pi) =
(y, t) ∈ [0, y
r
2]
2 × [0, T ]2
∣∣∣∣∣
(IC[i, j]) ti − Ci(yi) ≥ tj − Cj(yj) for all i 6= j ∈ N
(IR)
∑
i pii (U
i(yi)− ti) ≥ 0
(NB[i]) ti − Ci(yi) ≥ V ri for all i ∈ N

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for some large finite T . Then the graph of Γ′
Gr(Γ′) =
{
(pi, {(yi, ti)}2i=1) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, yr2]2 × [0, T ]2 : {(yi, ti)}2i=1 ∈ Γ′(pi)
}
is closed. Moreover, for any closed interval Π ⊆ [0, 1], Γ′(Π) is bounded. So by
Theorem 3.4 in Stokey and Lucas [20], Γ′ is upper hemi-continuous.
As for lower-hemicontinuity, we first note, that of the five possible constraints, at
most four will bind. To see this, suppose there is (y, t) ∈ Γ(pi) for some pi such that
all five constraints bind. Then we have the following series of implications
(a) NB[i] binds for i = 1, 2 implies that state i contract is on the state i principal’s
RSW indifference curve;
(b) IC[1,2] binds implies that (y2, t2) is on the state 1 principal’s indifference;
(c) IC[21] binds implies that (y1, t1) is on the state 1 principal’s indifference;
(d) Items (b) and (c) imply that y1 = y2 =: y
′ and t1 = t2 =: t′ since the indifference
curves cross only once due to item (a.iii) of Assumption 1.2
(e) Items (a), (b) and (d) imply that y′ = yr2, t
′ = U2(yr2) since y
r
2 is defined such
that U2(yr2)− C1(yr2) = V 1r ;
(f) U1(y′) − t′ < 0 since U1(·) is tangent to C1(·) at y1r and therefore any y 6= yr1
results in U1(y)− t < 0;
(g) Items (e) and (f) imply IR is violated: pi(U1(y) − t) + (1 − pi)(U2(y) − t) =
pi(U1(y)− t) < 0.
The final item contradicts the assumption that (y, t) ∈ Γ(pi). Thus, for any pi at
most four constraints are active.
The following argument is due to Duggan and Kalandrakis [6]. Suppose four
constraints bind at pi0 ∈ (0, 1). Take any (y0, t0) ∈ Γ(pi0). Let fs(y, t, pi) for
s = 1, . . . , 4 denote the four binding constraints. Then the Jacobian matrix of
F (y, t, pi) := (fs(y, t, pi))
4
s=1 is invertible at (y
0, t0, pi0). So, by the implicit func-
tion theorem there exists a continuous function h(pi) such that h(pi0) = (y0, t0) and
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F (h(pi), pi) = 0 in an open neighbourhood around pi0. Since the remaining constraint
is slack at pi0, it is also slack in an open neighbourhood around pi0. Thus, there is an
open neighbourhood of pi0 such that h(pi) ∈ Γ(pi) for all pi in this neighbourhood and
we conclude that Γ is lower hemi-continuous at pi0.
If only d < 4 constraints bind at pi0, then let fs(y, t, pi), for s = 1, . . . , d denote
the d binding constraints and define gs(y, t, pi), for s = d + 1, . . . , 4 as affine linear
functions that are constant in pi, satisfy gs(y
0, t0, pi0) = 0 for all s = d+ 1, . . . , 4, and
have total derivative D(y,t)gs(y, t, pi) = vs such that the matrix
((
D(y,t)fs(y
0, t0, pi0)
)d
s=1
, (vs)
4
s=d+1
)
has full rank and is invertible. As above, we can apply the implicit function theorem
to conclude that Γ is lower hemi-continuous at pi0.
So by the Theorem of the Maximum (Stokey and Lucas [20, Theorem 3.6]), V ∗(pi)
is continuous in pi.
Lemma 1.14 If RSW-IC[1,2] binds, there are two cutoff points 0 < piFB < pir < 1
such that V ∗(pi) is the first best payoff if pi ≤ piFB and the ex ante RSW payoff if
pi ≥ pir.
Proof Claim 1 If pi is close enough to 1, V ∗(pi) = Vr(pi). This holds by Lemma
1.15 below: i∗ = 1. 
Claim 2 If pi is sufficiently small, then V ∗(pi) = VFB(pi). Recall that the superscript
E indicates the efficient action. To see that the first best solution is attainable for
small pi set y∗i = y
E
i , set t
∗
2 such that t
∗
2 − C2(yE2 ) = V 2r and set t∗1 sufficiently high
such that IC[1,2] is satisfied. To see that we can do this last step while satisfying the
IR constraint, note that, by Lemma 1.11, yE2 < y
r
2 which implies that t
∗
2 < t
r
2. Finally,
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since U2(yr2) = t
r
2, Lemma 1.11 implies that U
2(yE2 )− t∗2 > 0. Thus, we can find small
enough pi such that pi(U1(yE1 )− t∗1) + (1− pi)(U2(yE2 )− t∗2) = 0. 
Define pir := inf {pi ∈ [0, 1] : V ∗(pi) = Vr(pi)}. This infimum is attained in [0, 1)
due to Claim 1 above and Proposition 4 of Maskin and Tirole [11] which says that
the set of beliefs relative to which the RSW payoff is the unique equilibrium payoff
consists entirely of strictly positive vectors. As a result, pir < 1 regardless of κ so
[pir, 1) is always well defined and nonempty. By definition, V ∗(pi) = Vr(pi) if and only
if pi ∈ [pir, 1).
Further, by assumption, RSW-IC[1,2] binds which implies, by Lemma 1.11, that
the state 2 contract is inefficient. Thus, V FB(pi) > Vr(pi) for all pi ∈ (0, 1). Given
Claim 2, we must have pir > 0; otherwise, V FB(pi) and Vr(pi) must coincide, which is
a contradiction.
Define piFB := sup
{
pi ∈ [0, 1] : V ∗(pi) = V FB(pi)}. This supremum is attained in
(0, 1) by Claim 2. By definition V ∗(pi) = VFB(pi) if and only if pi ∈
(
0, piFB
]
. This
point exists and is strictly greater than 0 by Claim 3. Further, piFB < pir. To see
this, suppose piFB ≥ pir. Then there exists p˜i ∈ [pir, piFB]. But, by the definitions of
pir, piFB this implies
V ∗(p˜i) = VFB(p˜i) = Vr(p˜i) a contradiction, since by Lemma 1.11 the state 2 contract
is inefficient. Thus, 0 < piFB < pir < 1. Figure 1.1 plots V ∗, Vu, Vr and V FB.
Since pir < 1, due to Proposition 1.1 (item (ii) of the second statement) there is κ
close enough to 1 such that pir < pi∗ and for all pi ∈ (pir, pi∗) Proposition 1.2 holds.
Proof of Theorem 1.2 By Lemma 1.9 RSW-IC[1,2] binds since κ is assumed to
be sufficiently close to 1. Recall that for such κ, 0 < piFB < pir < pi∗ ≤ 1 (see
proof of Proposition 1.2).
Consider the following facts
(a) V ∗ and Vu are continuous: the former is proved in Lemma 1.14 (Claim 1), the
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latter is immediate by inspection of problem (1.5);
(b) V ∗(pi) > Vu(pi) for all pi ∈
(
0, piFB
]
: this holds since Vu(pi) cannot be efficient in
both states where as V ∗(pi) is first best by definition in this domain;
(c) V ∗(pi) < Vu(pi) for all pi ∈ [pir, pi∗): established by Proposition 1.2;
(d) V ∗(pi) > Vr(pi) for all pi ∈ (0, pir): by definition of pir in Lemma 1.14 (Claim 2).
Due to items (a) through (c), the intermediate value theorem guarantees the
existence of a pˆi ∈ (piFB, pir) such that for all pi ∈ (pˆi, pir), Vu(pi) > V ∗(pi). This
confirms the first statement of Theorem 1.2. Since pˆi ∈ (0, pir), by item (d) we also
have that V ∗(pi) > Vr(pi) thus confirming the second statement of Theorem 1.2.
Proof of Proposition 1.3 When RSW-IC[1,2] does not bind, the RSW contract in
both states is efficient. To see this, recall that the state 1 contract is always efficient
and note that, according to Proposition 2 of Maskin and Tirole [11], the problem
of the state 2 principal in this case is max(y2,t2) {t2 − C2(y2) : U2(y2)− t2 = 0}. So
Vu(0) = V
2
r and Vu(1) = V
1
r . Since Vu is convex and Vr is linear (see the proof of
Proposition 1.1, items (c) and (d)), Vu(pi) < Vr(pi) for all pi ∈ (0, 1).
1.8.3 Optimal Information Structure: Three States
Before proving the results of this section, we define the principal’s problems and
strategies relative to p. For this, we need some additional notation.
The RSW problem relative to information strategy p for principal in p-state i is
to choose {(yi, ti)}i∈I(p) to solve
max ti − Cpi(yi)
s.t. (p-RSW-IC[i, j]) tj − Cpj(yj) ≥ tk − Cpj(yk) for all j, k ∈ I(p); and
(p-RSW-IR[j]) Upj(yj) ≥ tj for all j ∈ I(p).
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I will refer to this problem as the p-RSW problem for p-state i or the pi-RSW problem.
Let V pir (pi; p) denote the pi-RSW given priors pi.
Our first lemma in this section characterizes the priors under which the RSW
payoff is unique for the fully informed principal problem.
Lemma 1.15 Consider the problem of the fully informed principal when there are
either two or three states. Let E ⊂ N denote the set of states for which the RSW
contracts are efficient. Define I := N/E to be the set of states with inefficient RSW
contracts and let i∗ = max {i ∈ E|i < min I}.
Then: (i) If I = ∅, the RSW payoff is the unique payoff for all priors; (ii) if
|I| = 1, then if pii∗ is sufficiently large, the RSW payoff is the unique equilibrium
payoff; and (iii) if |I| = 2, then if pi1 and pi2/(pi2 + pi3) are sufficiently close to 1, the
RSW payoff is the unique equilibrium payoff. Moreover, all of these bounds on priors
are strictly less than 1.
Proof First note that 1 ∈ {i ∈ E|i < min I} since state 1 is always efficient. There-
fore, i∗ is always well defined.
If I = ∅, then all states are efficient and the RSW contract is first best (see
Proposition 1.3). The RSW payoff is therefore the unique payoff for all priors.
Now suppose I 6= ∅. By Theorem 1 in Maskin and Tirole [11] {yˆi, tˆi}i∈N is an
equilibrium menu if and only if it satisfies the following conditions

(IC[i, j]) ti − Ci(yi) ≥ tj − Cj(yj) for all i 6= j ∈ N
(IR)
∑
i pii (U
i(yi)− ti) ≥ 0
(NB[i]) ti − Ci(yi) ≥ V ri for all i ∈ N.
Suppose there exists a menu {yˆi, tˆi}i∈N gives payoff strictly higher than the RSW
menu in equilibrium. For each i ∈ I, the action in the state i RSW contract is higher
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than the efficient level (see Lemma 1.11). For all i ∈ I, define δi = U i(yˆi)− tˆi. This
is the surplus given to the agent in state i by the proposed menu.
If the proposed menu delivers strictly higher payoff than the RSW menu, there
must exist at least one i ∈ I such that δi > 0. To see this, suppose not: for all
i ∈ I, U i (yˆi) − tˆi = 0. Call this assumption (?). Note that for all k ∈ E, Ck is
tangent to Uk at (yrk, t
r
k). This implies that for all (y
′
k, t
′
k) such that t
′
k−Ck(y′k) > V rk ,
Uk(y′k)− t′k < 0. This last implication, along with (?) and the equilibrium condition
IR implies that (yˆk, tˆk) = (y
r
k, t
r
k) for all k ∈ E. So, we have that {yˆi, tˆi}i∈N satisfies
IC[i, j] for all i, j ∈ N and U i (yˆi) − tˆi = 0 for all i ∈ N . But the RSW menu is the
best of all menus that satisfy these assumptions so that the menu {yˆi, tˆi}i∈N cannot
give a strictly higher payoff than the RSW menu.
Thus, there exist at least one state i ∈ I such that δi > 0. Note that this implies
that yˆi < y
r
i by Lemma 1.11. For each i ∈ I, define δ¯i := max(yi,ti) {U i(yi)− ti|ti − Ci(yi) ≥ V ir }.
So, δ¯i is the largest surplus we can assign to the state i agent for i ∈ I. Note that this
maximum is achieved at the efficient state i action along the state i RSW indifference
curve.
Now consider two cases.
Case 1: |I| = 1. Then i∗ + 1 ∈ I by definition and δi∗+1 > 0. I claim that if the
principal receives her RSW contract in state i∗ she will have strict incentive to lie
given state i∗+1 contract (yˆi∗+1, tˆi∗+1). To see this first note that, by Proposition 1.3,
RSW-IC[i∗, i∗+1] must bind: tri∗−Ci∗(yri∗) = tri∗+1−Ci∗(yri∗). Since MCi∗ > MCi∗+1
the indifference curves of the principal in states i∗ and i∗ + 1 cross only once and
the latter crosses the former from below. Consider the indifference curves that pass
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through the RSW contracts
V i
∗
r + C
i∗(y)− (V i∗+1r + Ci∗+1(y))

< 0 if y < yri∗+1
= 0 if y = yri∗+1
> 0 if y > yri∗+1
(1.24)
Note that
V i
∗
r + C
i∗(yˆi∗+1)−
(
V i
∗+1
r + C
i∗+1(yˆi∗+1)
) ≥ V i∗r + Ci∗(yˆi∗+1)− (tˆi∗+1 − Ci∗+1(yˆi∗+1)
+ Ci
∗+1(yˆi∗+1)
)
(1.25)
= V i
∗
r −
(
tˆi∗+1 − Ci∗(yˆi∗+1)
)
(1.26)
where the inequality follows from the NB[i∗+1] condition. Since yˆi∗+1 < yri∗+1, by the
first line of expression (1.24) we have that 0 > V i
∗
r +C
i∗(yˆi∗+1)−
(
V i
∗+1
r + C
i∗+1(yˆi∗+1)
)
which, given (1.26), implies that V i
∗
r < tˆi∗+1 − Ci∗(yˆi∗+1).
Thus, given the state i∗+1 contract
(
yˆi∗+1, tˆi∗+1
)
, to satisfy incentive compatibility
we must give the state i∗ principal payoff that is strictly higher than her RSW payoff.
Since i∗ ∈ E, Ci∗ is tangent to U i∗ at the RSW contract; thus, any contract that
increases the payoff to the principal in this state necessarily assigns a strictly positive
deficit to the agent. Denote this deficit by δi∗ := tˆi∗ − U i∗ (yˆi∗) > 0.
Without loss of generality, set (yˆi, tˆi) = (y
r
i , t
r
i ) for all i ∈ E/{i∗} and assume the
resulting contract is incentive compatible. Then, if pii∗ is close enough to 1
∑
i
pii
(
U i(yi)− ti
)
=
∑
i∈E/{i∗}
pii
(
U i(yˆi)− tˆi
)− pii∗δi∗ + pii∗+1δi∗+1
= −pii∗δi∗ + pii∗+1δi∗+1 ≤ −pii∗δi∗ + pii∗+1δ¯i∗+1 < 0
where the first equality follows since there is zero surplus for the agent in states
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E/{i∗}. This contradicts the assumption that {yˆi, tˆi}i∈N is an equilibrium.
Case 2: |I| = 2. The state 2 and three contracts are inefficient. Then RSW-IC[1,2]
and RSW-IC[2,3] bind by Proposition 1.3. If δ2 > 0 or δ2 = 0 and δ3 > 0 then the
argument in Case 1 can be applied in much the same way; if pi1 is sufficiently large,
IR cannot hold and {yˆi, tˆi}i∈N cannot be an equilibrium.
Now suppose that δ3 > 0 and δ2 < 0. Without loss of generality, set (yˆ1, tˆ1) =
(yr1, t
r
1). As above, if the state 2 principal receives her RSW contract she will have a
strict incentive to lie given the state three contract (yˆ3, tˆ3). Thus, the menu {yˆi, tˆi}i∈N
must give the state 2 principal strictly higher payoff than her RSW contract. Define
δ2 := −δ2 > 0. If pi2/(pi2 + pi3) is close enough to 1, then
∑
i
pii
(
U i(yi)− ti
)
= pi1
(
U1(yˆ1)− tˆ1
)− pi2δ2 + pi3δ3
= −pi2δ2 + pi3δ3 ≤ (pi2 + pi3)
[
− pi2
pi2 + pi3
δ2 +
pi3
pi2 + pi3
δ¯3
]
< 0
where the first equality follows since there is zero surplus for the agent in state 1.
This contradicts the assumption that {yˆi, tˆi}i∈N is an equilibrium.
Finally note that Maskin and Tirole [11, Proposition 4] asserts that the set of
beliefs relative to which the RSW payoff is unique consists of strictly positive vectors.
Thus, the bounds we have placed on priors in this lemma are strictly less than one.
Proof of Proposition 1.4 Note that α is used below to denote conditional priors.
Be aware that α is redefined in subsequent lemmas. Further, any priors (conditional
or unconditional) superscripted with r are meant to be analogous to those in Propo-
sitions 1.1 and 1.2.
This proof proceeds by applying Proposition 1.2 to the various subgames associ-
ated with choosing different information acquisition options. Recall that in Proposi-
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tion 1.2, as long as κ < κ, pi∗ = 1. To ease exposition, when we apply Proposition 1.2
we sacrifice its generality (i.e. allowing the upper bound on priors to be less than 1)
and simply assume all the the starred priors (conditional or unconditional) are 1.
I first characterize priors such that p5 conforms to the Assumption 1.2.
Lemma 1.16 Let
C{1,3}(·) := pi1
pi1 + pi3
C1(·) + pi3
pi1 + pi3
C3(·)
and define U{1,3} in the same way. There exists priors pˆi ∈ ∆3 such that for all
pi1
pi1 + pi3
∈
[
pˆi1
pˆi1 + pˆi3
, 1
)
Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 are satisfied for the two state informed principal game with
principal payoff functions ordered (V {1,3}, V 2) = (t− C{1,3}, t− C2) and agent payoff
functions ordered (W {1,3},W 2) = (U{1,3} − t, U2 − t).
Proof I will prove that part (iii) from Assumption 1.1 holds. Parts (i) and (ii) of
Assumption 1.1 are immediate. Both parts of Assumption 1.2 are proved in a similar
manner.
Let α := pi1/(pi1 + pi3). By Assumption 1.1, there exists δ > 0 such that
MC1(y)
MC2(y)
,
MC2(y)
MC3(y)
> δ + 1.
Define
αˆ :=
κS2 − 1
δ(δ + 1) + κS2 − 1
< 1. (1.27)
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Then for all α ∈ [αˆ, 1) we have
MC{1,3}(y)−MC2(y) = α (MC1(y)−MC2(y))+ (1− α) (MC3(y)−MC2(y))
> MC3(y)
[
α
(
MC1(y)
MC3(y)
− MC
2(y)
MC3(y)
)
+ (1− α) (1− κS2 )]
= MC3(y)
[
α
(
MC1(y)
MC2(y)
− 1
)
MC2(y)
MC3(y)
+ (1− α) (1− κS2 )]
> MC3(y)
[
αδ(δ + 1) + (1− α)(1− κS2 )
]
> 0
where the first inequality follows from the definition of κS2 in (1.7) and the second
follows from the definition of αˆ. The lemma is proved.
(A) The proof of the statement is in the form of a series of claims, each describing
conditions on priors such that the principal prefers information acquisition strategy
p1 to each of the others. First, we prove that the state three RSW action is efficient
given either information acquisition strategy p1 or p4, under the assumptions of claim
(A).
Lemma 1.17 There exists κI2 such that for all κ
I
2 > κ
I
2, the p
4-RSW and p1-RSW
state 3 actions are efficient.
Proof I first prove the statement for the p4-RSW state 3 action. Let V 3r (pi; p) denote
the state three p-RSW payoff. Note that
V 3r (pi; p
4) + C2(y) = U3(y) (1.28)
has two solutions since C2 is convex, U i is concave and V 3r (pi; p
4)+C2(yr2) = U
2(yr2) <
U3(yr2). Define yˆ as the larger solution to (1.28). As y increases in a neighbourhood
around yˆ, the left hand side of (1.28) crosses the right hand side from below. Since
MC2(yˆ) > MU3(yˆ) we have V 3r (pi; p
4) + C2(y) > U3(y) for all y ≥ yˆ.
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Since MU3(yE3 ) = MC
3(yE3 ), as we increase κ
I
2, y
E
3 increases towards infinity.
Thus, there exists a κI2 such that for all κ
I
2 > κ
I
2, y
E
3 > yˆ. Thus, by the previous
paragraph, V 3r (pi; p
4) + C2(yE3 ) > U
3(yE3 ) and therefore RSW-IC[1,2] does not bind
and the lemma holds.
To see that this holds for the p1-RSW state 3 action, define α := pi1/(pi1 + pi2)
and replace C2 and U2 above with αC1(·) + (1 − α)C2(·) andαU1(·) + (1 − α)U2(·)
respectively.
The next lemma characterizes priors such that information acquisition strategy
p1 is strictly preferred to information acquisition strategy p4.
Lemma 1.18 Define α = pi1/(pi1+pi2). There exists pi1 < 1, α
r(p4) < 1 such that for
all pi1 ∈ (pi1, 1) and α ∈ (αr(p4), 1) the unique payoff following information acquisition
strategy p4 is the p4-RSW payoff and any continuation payoff following information
acquisition strategy p1 is strictly larger.
Proof From Lemma 1.9, the state 2 p4-RSW contract is inefficient for sufficiently
small κS1 and from Lemma 1.17 we know that the state three p
4-RSW contract is
efficient. Thus, from Lemma 1.15 part (ii), i∗ = 1 so there exists pi1 such that the
RSW payoff is the unique payoff following information strategy p4 for pi ∈ (pi1, 1).
By Lemma 1.17 the state 3 p1-RSW contract is efficient. Thus, V 3r (pi; p
4) =
V 3r (pi; p
1).
Now, consider the RSW problem of the state {1, 2} principal
V {1,2}r (pi; p
1) := max
(y12,t12)
{
t12 − αC1(y12)− (1− α)C2(y12) :αU1(y12) + (1− α)U2(y12) = t12
}
(1.29)
Since κS1 is small, we can apply Proposition 1.2 to conclude that there exists α
r(p4)
such that αr(p4) < 1 and for all α ∈ (αr(p4), 1) we have V {1,2}r (pi; p1) > αV 1r (pi; p4) +
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(1− α)V 2r (pi; p4). So (pi1 + pi2)V {1,2}(pi; p1) + pi3V 3r (pi; p1) >
∑
i piiV
i
r (pi; p
4).
The next lemma characterizes priors such that information acquisition strategy
p3 is strictly preferred to information acquisition strategy p2.
Lemma 1.19 Define α := pi2/(pi2 + pi3). There exists pi
r(p2) < 1 and α < 1 such
that for all pi1 ∈ (pir(p2), 1) and α ∈ (α, 1) the unique payoff following information
acquisition strategy p2 is the p2-RSW payoff and the p3 payoff is strictly larger.
Proof The continuation game following information strategy p2 is a two state game
with priors (pi1, pi2+pi3). Define κ(p
2) := supyMC
1(y)/ (αMC2(y) + (1− α)MC3(y)).
According to Proposition 1.2, if κ(p2) is sufficiently small, there exists pir(p2) such
that pir(p2) < 1, the unique payoff following information acquisition strategy p2 is the
p2-RSW payoff for all pi1 ∈ (pir(p2), 1) and the p3 payoff is strictly larger.
I now show that κ(p2) can be made sufficiently small given the hypotheses of the
proposition κ(p2) < κS1 /
(
α + (1− α)/κS2
)
. For fixed κS2 , if we take α and κ
S
1 close
enough to 1, κ(p2) can be made sufficiently small to apply Proposition 1.2. The
lemma is proved.
The next lemma characterizes priors such that information acquisition strategy
p3 is strictly preferred to information acquisition strategy p5.
Lemma 1.20 Let α = pi1/(pi1 +pi3). There exists α < 1 and pi
r(p5) < 1 such that for
all α ∈ (α, 1) and pi1 ∈ (pir(p5), 1) the unique payoff following information acquisition
strategy p5 is the p5-RSW payoff and the p3 payoff is strictly larger.
Proof By Lemma 1.16, there exists an αˆ such that for α ∈ (αˆ, 1) the problem for
the principal who chooses information acquisition strategy p5 = {{1, 3}, {2}} is a two
state informed principal problem with priors (pi1 + pi3, pi2) that satisfies Assumption
1.2.
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Define κ(p5) := supyMC
13(y)/MC2(y). Proposition 1.2 applies and the claim is
proved if κ(p5) is sufficiently close to 1. I now check whether κ(p5) can be sufficiently
close to 1. Note that κ(p5) ≤ ακS1 + (1 − α)/κS2 < ακS1 + (1 − α) where the first
inequality follows from the convexity of the supremum operator. Choosing α less
than but close to 1 and small κS1 , we can make κ(p
5) small and Proposition 1.2
applies.
Finally, note that for the informed game with state space p1, the first best payoff
has been achieved since each p1-state principal is producing her efficient output. It
follows from Proposition 1.3 that introducing further ignorance (i.e. an information
strategy of p3) will not improve payoffs. Thus, information acquisition strategy p1 is
strictly preferred to information acquisition strategy p3 for any priors.
By Lemma 1.19, the principal prefers p3 to p2 for appropriately restricted priors for
any equilibrium following the choice of p2; thus, she prefers p1 to p2 on these priors
as well. Moreover, by Lemma 1.20 the principal prefers p3 to p5 for appropriately
restricted priors for any equilibrium following the choice of p5; thus, she prefers p1 to
p5 on these priors as well.
To see that the intersection of the sets characterized in Lemmas 1.18 to 1.20 is
open and nonempty, note that any priors such that pi1 is sufficiently large (but less
than 1) and pi2 is sufficiently larger than pi3 is in this intersection.
(B) Follows same procedure as part (A).
(C) As in part (A), this part is shown in a series of lemmas each characterizing the
set of priors such that ignorance is better than each of the other information acqui-
sition options. The first lemma characterizes the set of priors such that information
acquisition strategy p3 is strictly preferred to information acquisition strategy p1.
Lemma 1.21 There exists pir(p1) such that pir(p1) < 1 and for any pi1 + pi2 ∈
(pir(p1), 1) the unique payoff following information acquisition strategy p1 is the p1-
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RSW payoff and the completely uninformed principal’s payoff is strictly larger.
Proof Define α := pi1/(pi1+pi2) and κ(p
1) := supy (αMC
1(y) + (1− α)MC2(y)) /MC3(y).
The game following information strategy p1 is a two state informed principal prob-
lem with priors (pi1 + pi2, pi3). Since the supremum operator is convex κ(p
1) <
ακS1κ
S
2 +(1−α)κS2 . Thus, we choose κS1 , κS2 sufficiently small to apply Proposition 1.2
and our claim follows.
The next lemma characterizes the set of priors such that information acquisition
strategy p3 is strictly preferred to information acquisition strategy p2.
Lemma 1.22 There exists pir(p2) such that pir(p2) < 1 and for any pi1 ∈ (pir(p2), 1)
the unique payoff following information acquisition strategy p2 is the p2-RSW payoff
and the uninformed principals payoff is strictly larger.
Proof This proof is analogous to that of Lemma 1.19. Since κ(p2) < supy
MC1(y)
MC3(y)
≤
κS1κ
S
2 we can choose κ
S
1 , κ
S
2 sufficiently small to apply Proposition 1.2.
The next lemma characterizes the set of priors such that information acquisition
strategy p1 is strictly preferred to information acquisition strategy p4.
Lemma 1.23 Define α = pi1/(pi1 + pi2). There exists α
r(p4) < 1 and pi1 such that
for any α ∈ (αr(p4), 1) and pi1 ∈ (pi1, 1) the unique payoff following information
acquisition strategy p4 is the p4-RSW payoff and the p1-RSW payoff is strictly larger.
Proof From Lemma 1.9, we know that the state 2 and 3 p4-RSW contracts are
inefficient for sufficiently small κS1 and κ
S
2 respectively. Thus, from Lemma 1.15 item
(iii), there exists priors pi the p4-RSW payoff is the unique payoff following information
acquisition strategy p4 for pi1 ∈ (pi1, 1) and any pi2/(pi2 + pi3) ∈ (pi2/(pi2 + pi3), 1).
This remainder analogous to Lemma 1.18 except we appeal to Lemma 1.8 to
ensure that V 3r (α; p
1) ≥ V 3r (α; p4) instead of Lemma 1.9.22
22The p4 payoffs are constant in α so the statement trivially holds for all α ∈ [0, 1].
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Our final lemma characterizes the set of priors such that information acquisition
strategy p1 is strictly preferred to information acquisition strategy p5.
Lemma 1.24 Let α = pi1/(pi1 + pi3). There exists, α < 1 and pi
r(p5) such that
pir(p5) < 1 and for any pi1 + pi3 ∈ (pir(p5), 1) and α ∈ (α, 1) the unique payoff fol-
lowing information acquisition strategy p5 is the p5-RSW payoff and the uninformed
principals payoff is strictly larger.
Proof This follows immediately from Lemma 1.20. Although Lemma 1.20 is proved
under the assumptions of claim (A), only the hypothesis that kS1 is sufficiently small
was used in the proof. Since claim (C) shares this hypothesis, the lemma applies here
as well.
To see that the intersection of the sets characterized in Lemmas 1.21 to 1.24 is
nonempty and open, note any priors with pi1 sufficiently large (but less than 1) is in
this intersection.
(D) If pi1 is small enough, we can achieve the first best ex ante payoff using the same
technique as in Claim 2 of Lemma 1.14. If κI1 and κ
I
2 are large enough, we can show
that the p4-RSW menu is efficient and therefore achieves the first best ex ante payoff
using the same technique as in Lemma 1.17.
Proof of Corollary 1 If both κS1 and κ
S
2 are close to 1, simply apply Proposition 1.4
(C).
Suppose κS2 is close to 1 and κ
I
2 is large so that p
1 is optimal on the set of pri-
ors described in Proposition 1.4 (A): V (pi; p1) := (pi1 + pi2)V
{1,2}
r (α; p1) + pi3V
3
r >∑
piiV
i
r . Since V (pi; p
1) is continuous in pi, V (pi; p1) → V (pi; p3) := V {1,2,3}r (pi, p3) as
pi3 → 0. So for small pi3 there exists δ > 0 such that V (pi; p1) − V (pi; p3) = δ and
V (pi; p3)−∑i piiV ir = V (pi; p1)− δ −∑i piiV ir > 0.
For κI1 large and κ
S
2 small close to 1, the proof is similar.
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1.8.4 Information Acquisition as Hidden Action
Denote the value of the principal’s RSW problem in state k ∈ {0, 1, 2} by
V rk := max{(yi,ti)}i∈{0,1,2}
tk − Ck(yk)
s.t. (IC[i, j]) ti − Ci(yi) ≥ tj − Ci(yj) for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2} and
(RSW-IR[i]) U i(yi) = ti for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2}
Let (yri , t
r
i ) denote the RSW contract for the state i ∈ {0, 1, 2} principal.23
The following lemma gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium
in this environment.
Lemma 1.25 The contract {(y∗0, t∗0), (y∗1, t∗1), (y∗2, t∗2)} and the information acquisition
strategy α is an equilibrium if and only if
(MIX) α ∈ argmax
{
α [t∗0 − C0(y∗0)] + (1− α)
∑
i=1,2 pii (t
∗
i − Ci(y∗i ))
}
(IR) α
∑
i=1,2 pii (U
i(y∗0)− t∗0) + (1− α)
∑
i=1,2 pii (U
i(y∗i )− t∗i ) ≥ 0
(IC) t∗i − Ci(y∗i ) ≥ t∗j − Ci(y∗j ) for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}
(NB) t∗i − Ci(y∗i ) ≥ V ri for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2}
Proof of Lemma 1.25 Sufficiency: Suppose the contract {(y∗0, t∗0), (y∗1, t∗1), (y∗2, t∗2)}
and the information acquisition strategy α satisfy MIX, IR, IC, and NB. Then, the
contract {(y∗0, t∗0), (y∗1, t∗1), (y∗2, t∗2)} is an equilibrium contract given α by Theorem 1
in Maskin and Tirole [11]. Moreover, given, the contract {(y∗0, t∗0), (y∗1, t∗1), (y∗2, t∗2)},
the MIX condition ensures that the principal cannot deviate profitably by choosing
a different α.
Necessity: Suppose, IR, IC, or NB is violated. Then by Theorem 1 in Maskin
23I have suppressed the dependance of the uninformed principal’s RSW strategies and payoffs on
priors.
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and Tirole [11] {(y∗0, t∗0), (y∗1, t∗1), (y∗2, t∗2)} cannot be an equilibrium given α. If MIX is
violated, then the principal has a profitable deviation to another α.
Proof of Lemma 1.1 Due to the IC conditions of the equilibrium tr2 − C2(yr2) ≥
tr0−C2(yr0) and tr1−C1(yr1) ≥ tr0−C1(yr0). Weighting each of these by the appropriate
prior we have
2∑
i=1
piri (t
r
i − Ci(yri )) ≥ tr0 − C0(yr0).
Proof of Proposition 1.5 Let {(y∗0, t∗0), (y∗1, t∗1), (y∗2, t∗2)} be an equilibrium contract
with information strategy α∗. Due to lemma 1.1, without loss of generality we can
set α∗ = 0. I are therefore considering an equilibrium in a 2 state informed principal
problem (while still respecting the extra incentive compatibility constraint of the
uninformed principal). Thus, by Proposition 1.2, since κ is close to 1, we know that
there exists an interval of priors such that the action is inefficient in at least one state.
Suppose the inefficient state is state 2. Let (y′2, t
′
2) be a contract for the state 2
principal that lies on the same indifference curve as the contract (y∗2, t
∗
2) but is closer
to the efficient level of y. Then the agent receives a higher payoff at (y′2, t
′
2) in state
2 than at (y∗2, t
∗
2).
24
Choose (y′0, t
′
0) to be the (unique) intersection between the state 1 and state 2
indifference curves passing through the points (y∗1, t
∗
1) and (y
∗
2, t
∗
2) respectively. Then
t∗1−C1(y∗1) = t′0−C1(y′0) and t′2−C2(y′1) = t′0−C2(y′0). Weighting by the appropriate
prior and summing these two equations we get
t′0 − C0(y′0) = pi
(
t∗1 − C1(y∗1)
)
+ (1− pi) (t′2 − C2(y′1)) (1.30)
24To see this note that, fixing the payoff to the principal, the greatest payoff to the agent is at the
efficient level of y: max(y,t){U i(y)−t : t−Ci(y) = V¯ } = max{U i(y)−Ci(y)− V¯ } = U i(yEi )−Ci(yEi )
where V¯ is a constant.
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Now we check the agents IR constraint. First note that
pi(U1(y∗1)− t∗1) + (1− pi)(U2(y′2)− t′2) > pi(U1(y∗1)− t∗1) + (1− pi)(U2(y∗2)− t∗2) ≥ 0
where the first inequality follows by our choice of (y′2, t
′
2) and the second follows since
{(y∗0, t∗0), (y∗1, t∗1), (y∗2, t∗2)} is assumed to be an equilibrium and α∗ = 0. Thus, there
exists α′ > 0 such that
α′
(
U0(y′0)− t′0
)
+ (1− α′) [pi(U1(y∗1)− t∗1) + (1− pi)(U2(y′2)− t′2)] = 0.
Since (y′2, t
′
2) is on the same indifference curve as (y
∗
2, t
∗
2)
pi
(
t∗1 − C1(y∗1)
)
+ (1− pi) (t∗2 − C2(y∗1)) = pi (t∗1 − C1(y∗1))+ (1− pi) (t′2 − C2(y′1))
and due to equation (1.30)
α′
(
t′0 − C0(y′0)
)
+ (1− α′)[pi(t∗1 − C1(y∗1))+ (1− pi)(t′2 − C2(y′1))] =
pi
(
t∗1 − C1(y∗1)
)
+ (1− pi)(t∗2 − C2(y∗1)).
Thus, the expected payoff to the principal from offering contract {(y′0, t′0), (y∗1, t∗1), (y′2, t′2)}
with α′ is equal to the expected payoff from offering {(y∗0, t∗0), (y∗1, t∗1), (y∗2, t∗2)} with
α∗.
If the state 1 contract is inefficient, we can similarly find a payoff equivalent menu
with positive probability of being ignorant.
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Chapter 2
When Should an Employer Offer a
Menu Contract?
2.1 Introduction
When a privately informed employer is contracting with a worker, the employer needs
to design a contract that releases the right information at the right time to optimally
exploit her information asymmetry. For example, consider a law firm which has
advanced knowledge about the likelihood of winning a trial and needs to assign an
attorney to the case. In addition, the law firm cannot observe the effort the attorney
exerts for the case. A number of papers have analyzed such environments but have
restricted the contracts proposed by the principal to be point-contracts: contracts
that leave the principal no discretion once a contract is accepted (see for example
Beaudry [1]; Inderst [3]; Chade and Silvers [2]1; Kaya [4]; Silvers [10]). For example,
the law firm may be restricted to paying a wage based on the only observable outcome:
whether the trial is won or lost. On the other hand, she could in addition specify
1Chade and Silvers [2] do consider more general contracts as a robustness check but mainly focus
on point contracts. See below for more details.
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bonuses to be paid that depend on the difficulty of the case. In this paper I allow
the principal to propose contracts that allow her further discretion after the contract
has been accepted. Such contracts are called menu-contracts in the literature since
they take the form of a list of contracts that is offered to the agent from which the
principal chooses after the agent has accepted.
First, I prove that allowing menu-contracts removes implausible inefficient equi-
libria that exist when only point-contracts are considered without needing to make
ad-hoc assumptions on the set of equilibria studied; typically, these inefficient equi-
libria are avoided in the literature via equilibrium refinements or by assuming the
principal will separate in the least costly way. These equilibria exists because point-
contracts can subject the principal to the agent’s arbitrary off-path posterior beliefs
that deter her from exploiting her private information. For example, very inefficient
contracts can be supported in equilibrium by punishing deviations from said contracts
with agent’s beliefs that put probability 1 on the worst state. I characterize the lower
bound payoff for each principal type in a two-type principal-agent model with moral
hazard when the principal is unrestricted in her contract choice. The contract that
achieves this lower bound is belief free: it is acceptable to the agent regardless of her
beliefs about the principal’s type and is therefore not susceptible to the punishing
off-path beliefs mentioned above. Moreover, I show that this lower bound is always
strictly higher than the lower bound when the principal is restricted to offering point-
contracts. In particular, the set of menu-contract equilibrium payoffs is higher than
the set of point-contract equilibrium payoffs in the strong set order.
Further, depending on the specific environment, the restriction to point-contracts
can strictly reduce the informed principal’s ex ante payoff, and thus the value of in-
formation to the principal. While Myerson’s [7] inscrutability principle implies that
the principal cannot lose by remaining inscrutable via menu-contracts, I characterize
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precisely when this ability to remain inscrutable and retain discretion after the con-
tract is accepted is strictly beneficial to the principal. If one wants to understand the
principal’s incentives to gather information prior to entering a contract, restricting
the space of contracts to point-contracts can skew results towards ignorance.
Myerson [7] defined the general problem of the privately informed principal while,
in a specialized environment, Maskin and Tirole [5] characterize the equilibria in the
model and derive their properties. In particular, Maskin and Tirole characterize a
lower bound in informed principal problems in environments with pure adverse selec-
tion (i.e. environments with no hidden actions). Segal and Whinston [9] successfully
apply Maskin and Tirole’s methodology to reduce the indeterminacy of equilibria in
a class of bilateral contracting problems. Like our work, Segal and Winston use the
concept of menu-contracts to eliminate very inefficient equilibria. Their work dif-
fers from the current paper in that the private information of the principal is her
own hidden effort, in particular her profile of trade with other agents, and therefore
endogenous in their model.
To my knowledge, there has not been a complete characterization in the literature
of the equilibria in a model of moral hazard when the principal has private information
of the productivity of the agent’s effort and is not restricted in her contract choice.
Notably, Chade and Silvers [2] consider menu-contracts in a robustness check of one
of their main results. They show that the equilibrium payoff in their result, the least-
cost separating payoff, can be supported by a menu-contract equilibrium. I show
that the principal can never do worse than under the menu-contract equilibrium they
construct and depending on the parameters of the model there may exist menu-
contract equilibria under which the principal can do strictly better.
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2.2 Model
2.2.1 Preferences and Technologies
I adopt a model similar to Silvers [10]. The agent (e.g. the potential worker) is
(weakly) risk averse and maximizes expected utility. Her von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function over wage income, w, and effort, a, is given by U(w)−a with U ′(w) > 0
and U ′′(w) ≤ 0. The agent chooses an effort a from a set A := {a1, a2} ⊂ R2+ with
0 ≤ a1 < a2 <∞. Let h := U−1 denote the inverse of U .
The effort chosen induces a conditional probability distribution over the set of
possible outcomes Q := {qs, qf} ⊂ R2++ where qf < qs <∞ (the subscript f denotes
failure while s denotes success). These outcome are the principal’s revenues. Thus,
if she pays wage w and outcome qn is realized her payoff is qn − w.
The principal (e.g. the employer) is a risk neutral expected profit maximizer who
needs to hire the agent to complete a task. Task productivity can either be high or
low. In particular, each type of task is associated with a set of conditional probabil-
ity distributions that determines the probability of the task being successful given a
particular effort level. The task of type i ∈ {H,L} has conditional probability dis-
tribution Πi = {pii(a1), pii(a2)} where pii(a) = (piis(a), piif (a)) denotes the conditional
probability distribution across Q when the effort is a ∈ A. Set piHs(a2) > piLs(a2) and
piHs(a1) ≥ piLs(a1) so that the type-H task is more productive that the type-L task.
Let λ ∈ (0, 1) be the common prior probability that the task is of high probability;
i.e. has conditional probability distribution ΠH . I will refer to a principal who has
task type i as a type-i principal.
I assume that the probability distributions satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio
property (MLRP): the relative likelihood of a higher outcome to a lower outcome is
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increasing in the effort. Formally, for both i ∈ {H,L}
piis(a1)
piif (a1)
<
piis(a2)
piif (a2)
.
2.2.2 Contracts
A point-contract is a set of payments from the principal to the agent w ∈ [w,∞)2
such that the principal pays the agent wn when outcome qn is realized where w > −∞
for n ∈ {s, f}.
A menu-contract is a direct revelation mechanism that specifies a set of point-
contracts {wH ,wL} such that wi ∈ [w,∞)2 for all i ∈ {H,L} and allows the principal
to choose from amongst this set after the agent has accepted the offer.2 Note that a
point-contract can be seen as a degenerate menu-contract where wH = wL.
I will generically refer to a contract offered for corresponding to outcome qn with
the notation Cn with Cn = {CHn, CLn}. A contract Cn, for n ∈ {s, f} could be a
menu-contract (i.e. Cn = {wHn , wLn}) or a point-contract (i.e. Cn = wn).
2.2.3 Information
I assume that the principal perfectly observes the task productivity while the agent
does not. Let ρ(C) := {ρ(C;H), ρ(C;L)} denote the agent posterior belief over the
type of the principal after observing the proposed contract C. Further, let
p(a; ρ(C)) := ρ(C;H)piH(a) + ρ(C;L)pi2(a)
denote the agent’s expected probability distribution over Q conditional on having
chose effort a ∈ A where pn(a; ρ(C)) is her expected probability of outcome qn con-
2The formal timing of the game is outlined in Section 2.2.4.
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ditional on having chosen effort a ∈ A for n ∈ {s, f}.
2.2.4 Timing
The timing of the game is as follows:
Realization of
Information
1
Contract
Offer
2
Agent
Response
3
Contract Choice
4(a)
Realization of outcome
and Implementation
4(b)
In stage 1, nature chooses the principal’s technology and this is observed by the
principal. In stage 2, the principal offers the agent a contract. The agent accepts
or rejects the contract in stage 3. If the agent rejects the contract, the principal
receives zero utility and the agent receives utility U¯ . In stage 4, if a point-contract
was offered, the game skips to stage 4(b); the agent chooses her effort level, the
outcome is realized and the corresponding wage is paid. If a menu-contract was
offered, the principal chooses from the menu of contracts in stage 4(a). Then stage
4(b) follows as before: the agent chooses her effort level, the outcome is realized and
the corresponding wage is paid.
2.2.5 Constraints
Point Contracts
A contract C will implement effort a if it is incentive compatible and individually
rational for the agent. A point-contract is incentive compatible for the agent for
effort ak if
∑
n∈{s,f}
[pn(ak; ρ(C))− pn(ak−1; ρ(C))]U(Cn) ≥ ak − ak−1 (AIC(ak; ρ(C)))
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where a0 = 0 and is individual rationality for effort ak for k ∈ {1, 2} if
∑
n∈{s,f}
pn(ak; ρ(C))U(Cn)− ak ≥ U¯ . (AIR(ak; ρ(C)))
A type-i principal who implements effort a ∈ A with contract Ci incurs expected
cost
∑
n∈{s,f} piin(a)w
i
n where, again with some abuse of notation, {wis, wif} is either
a point-contract offered by type-i or the type-i part of the menu contact offered,
and reaps expected benefit
∑
n∈{s,f} piin(a)qn. Suppose each type i ∈ {H,L} principal
implements effort a(i). The contract Ci that implements a ∈ A is incentive compatible
for the type-i principal if it satisfies for all i, j ∈ {H,L}
∑
n∈{s,f}
piin(a(i))(qn − win) ≥
∑
n∈{s,f}
piin(a(j))(qn − wjn). (PIC(a; i, j))
Menu Contracts
Due to Myerson’s [7] inscrutability principle, the agent’s individual rationality con-
straint need only be satisfied in expectation. A feasible menu-contract must be indi-
vidually rational for the agent and incentive compatible for both the agent and the
principal. A menu-contract C is individually rational if
λ
 ∑
n∈{s,f}
piHn(a(1))U(w
H
n )− a(H)
+ (1− λ)
 ∑
n∈{s,f}
piLn(a(L))U(w
L
n )− a(L)
 ≥ U¯ .
A separating menu-contract C (i.e. a menu-contract
{
wH ,wL
}
such that wH 6=
wL) is incentive compatible for the agent if AIC(a(H); {1, 0}) and AIC(a(L); {0, 1})
are satisfied for each a(i) for i ∈ {H,L}. A pooling menu-contract C, like a pool-
ing point-contract, is incentive compatible if a(H) = a(L) = a and it satisfies
AIC(a; {λ, 1 − λ}). If a(i) = a1 for any i ∈ {H,L}, the principal does not have
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to incentivize the agent to take an effort since she has already accepted the menu-
contract.
Finally, a menu-contract C that implements a is incentive compatible for the
principal if it satisfies PIC(a; i, j) for i, j ∈ {H,L}.
2.3 Preliminary Analysis
In this section we establish a number of benchmark equilibrium contracts and their
payoffs. I use these payoffs to establish upper and lower bounds on payoffs that are
supported in equilibrium for the game where only point-contracts are allowed and the
game where menu-contracts can be offered.
I first define the contracts that would result if the task type were common knowl-
edge; the payoff from these contracts is called the public information benchmark. It
is first best ex ante payoff for the principal. Further, we define the lowest payoffs
supported by an equilibrium in the game where only point-contracts can be offered
and the game where menu-contracts can be offered.
2.3.1 The Public Information Benchmark
Let w = {ws, wf} denote a generic point-contract. When the principal’s type is public
information, for each effort a the principal of type i ∈ {H,L} solves
min
w
∑
n∈{s,f}
piin(a)wn s.t. AIC(a; ρ(w)) and AIR(a; ρ(w))
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where ρ(w; i) = 1 for all w. Denote the solution to this problem by w∗(a; i). The
principal then choose the effort a that maximizes
∑
n∈{s,f}
piin(a) (qn − w∗n(a; i)) .
Denote this effort by a∗(i).
2.3.2 Lower Bound Equilibrium Point-Contract Payoff
If
piHs(a2)− piHs(a1) > piLs(a2)− piLs(a1)
then the lower bound point contract payoff is obtained when both principal types
offer w∗(a∗(L);L). It is straightforward to check that this equilibrium is supported
by agent’s beliefs that put probability 1 on the principle being type-L whenever any
contract w′ 6= w∗(a∗(L);L) is offered.
2.3.3 Lower Bound Equilibrium Menu-Contract Payoff
Let a(i) denote the effort implemented by the principal when she has a type-i task for
i ∈ {H,L}. In the spirit of Maskin and Tirole [5] a menu-contract plus induced effort
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set
{(
wHr , a(H)
)
,
(
wLr , a(L)
)}
is RSW for i ∈ {H,L} if the type-i principal solves3
U(i) =

max
{(wH ,a(H)),(wL,a(L))}
∑
n piin(a(i)) (q
i
n − win) subject to∑
n∈{s,f}
piin(a(H))U(w
i
n)− a(i) ≥ U¯ for i ∈ {H,L}
(piis(a(i))− piis(a1))
[
U(wis)− U(wif )
] ≥ a(i)− a1 for i ∈ {H,L}∑
n∈{s,f}
piin(a(i)) (qn − win) ≥
∑
n∈{s,f}
piin(a(j)) (qn − wjn) for i, j ∈ {H,L}
.
When menu-contracts are allowed, the RSW problem generates lower bound pay-
offs for the type-i principal since the agent will accept any RSW menu regardless
of her belief about the type of the principal.4 To see this, note first that the RSW
problem for the type-i principal specifies an entire menu: a contract for each task
type j ∈ {H,L}. This menu must be incentive compatible for every principal type
j ∈ {H,L}, not just type-i. Finally, this menu must guarantee the agent her reser-
vation payoff ex post and induces the appropriate effort level regardless of the type
of task the principal has. Thus, the agent will always accept an RSW menu and
perform the correct effort. The type-i principal can always deviate to her RSW menu
and obtain the associated payoff.5
2.4 The Deficiency of Point-Contracts
Let PM be the set of ex ante equilibrium payoffs for the principal when menu-
contracts are allowed andPP be the set of ex ante equilibrium payoffs for the principal
when only point-contracts are allowed. In our first result, we prove thatPM is higher
3RSW is an acronym for Rothchild-Stiglitz-Wilson, a reference to the similar least cost separating
contracts developed in the insurance models of Rothschild and Stiglitz [8] and Wilson [11].
4In terms of Myerson [7], any feasible solution to the RSW problem is safe. The RSW menu for
the type-i principal is her best safe menu.
5For further discussion of RSW menus see Maskin and Tirole [5].
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than PP in the strong set ordering (and the converse is not true).
Proposition 2.1 The set PM is higher in the strong set order than the set PP .
Further, if
piHs(a2)− piHs(a1) > piLs(a2)− piLs(a1), (2.1)
then there exists v ∈PP such that v < minPM .
Condition (2.1) ensures that a separating equilibrium exists. The value of the
RSW contract for the type-i principal provides a lower bound payoff on the princi-
pal’s problem if the principal can offer menu-contracts. As we show in Lemma 2.1
below, the RSW payoff can be obtained using point-contracts: it is the least-cost
separating equilibrium. However, PP also contains strictly lower payoffs. Allowing
menu-contracts eliminates these low value equilibria.
Proof The first statement follows since menu-contracts are generalizations of point-
contracts.
To prove the second statement I characterize the RSW menu-contract and show
that it gives a strictly higher ex ante payoff to the principal than the lower bound
point-contract. Due to the linearity of the principal’s indifference curves (in particu-
lar, the fact that this the linearity endows a single crossing property on the indifference
curves between principal’s types) computing the RSW can be simplified, as we show
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 The RSW allocation is the least-cost separating equilibrium that has
type-L principal offering w∗(a∗(L);L) and the type-H principal offering the solution
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to
IRSW

max
(wH ,a(H))
∑
n piHn(a(H))
(
qn − wHn
)
subject to∑
n∈{s,f}
piHn(a(H))U(w
H
n )− a(H) ≥ U¯
(AIR(a(H); {1, 0}))
(piHs(a(H))− piHs(a1))
[
U(wHs )− U(wHf )
]
= a(H)− a1
(AIC(a(H), {1, 0}))
∑
n∈{s,f}
piLn(a
∗(L)) (qn − wn(a∗(L))) ≥
∑
n∈{s,f}
piLn(a(H))
(
qn − wHn
)
(PIC(a∗(L);L))
.
The RSW menu always exists.
Proof This proof essentially follows that of Proposition 2 in Maskin and Tirole [5].
Let (wˆ(a(H);H), aˆ(H)) be a solution to IRSW .
First, we claim that the constraint AIC (a(H); {1, 0}) in problem IRSW must bind.
Suppose AIC (a(H); {1, 0}) holds with strict inequality and let piHs ≥ piHf . Then,
decrease wHs and increase w
H
f slightly to (w
H
s −s, wHf +f ) for small s, f > 0 so that
AIR (a(H); {1, 0}) and AIC (a(H); {1, 0}) still hold. Since piHs > piLs, (s, f ) can be
chosen such that the right hand side of PIC(a∗(L);L,H) (possibly weakly) decreases
while the objective function strictly increases. If piHs < piHf we can increase w
H
s and
decrease wHf and arrive at a similar result.
Second, we claim that {(wˆ(a(H);H), aˆ(H)), (w∗(a∗(L);L), a∗(L))} is incentive
compatible. This is vacuously true for the type-L principal since PIC(a∗(L);L,H)
is imposed in problem IRSW and w∗(a∗(L);L) is incentive compatible for the agent
by construction. Further, AIC(H, {1, 0}) is imposed in problem IRSW . It remains to
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show that
∑
n∈{s,f}
piHn(aˆ(H))
(
qn − wˆHn (aˆ(H))
) ≥ ∑
n∈{s,f}
piHn(a
∗(L)) (qn − wn(a∗(L))) . (2.2)
I claim that (2.2) holds with strict inequality. Note that the curve in (ws, wf ) space
implicitly defined by the agents RSW incentive compatibility constraint for the type-
H principal,
(piHs(a(H))− piHs(a1))
[
U(wHs )− U(wHf )
]
= a(H)− a1,
is strictly above that of the type-L principal,
(piLs(a(H))− piLs(aH))
[
U(wHs )− U(wHf )
]
= a(L)− a1
due to inequality (2.1). Further, the indifference curves the type-H principal’s in-
difference curves are steeper than the type-L principal’s. Therefore, the indifference
curves possess the single crossing property. If PIC(a∗(L);L,H) holds with equality,
wˆH lies to the north-west of w
∗
2 in (ws, wf ) space which implies that (2.2) strictly
holds. Otherwise, wˆH = w
∗
H and (2.2) strictly holds since pis(a
∗(H)) > pis(a∗(L)).
The RSW problem for the type-H principal is more constrained than IRSW but
(wˆ(a(H);H), a(H)) solves the latter problem and satisfies all the constraints of the
former. Therefore it solves the RSW problem for the type-H principal. Similarly,
the RSW problem for the type-H principal is more constrained than the public in-
formation problem, but (w∗(a∗(L);L), a∗(L)) solves the latter problem and satisfies
all the constraints of the former. Therefore it solves the RSW problem for the type-L
principal.
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To see that this menu-contract exists we first claim that w∗(a;L) exists for any
a. For a = a1, w
∗(a;L) = (h(U¯ + a1), h(U¯ + a1)). For a = a2, the constraints
AIC(a2; {0, 1}) and AIR(a2; {0, 1}) will be satisfied with equality and therefore define
the implicit functions
wf,AIR(ws) = h
(
U¯ + a2 − piLs(a2)U(ws)
piLf (a2)
)
, and
wf,AIC(ws) = h
(
U(ws)− a2 − a1
(piLs(a2)− piLs(a1))
)
.
Since wf,AIR is strictly decreasing and wf,AIC is strictly increasing, they must intersect
exactly once in R2. Denote this intersection point (w′s, w′f ). If this (w′s, w′f ) ∈ [w,∞)2
we are done: w∗(a;L) = (w′s, w
′
f ) . Otherwise, the solution is w
∗(a;L) = (w′′s , w)
where w′′s satisfies wf,AIC(w
′′
s ) = w. If the type-L principal is indifferent between a1
and a2, set a
∗(L) = a2.
I can break IRSW down into separate problems of minimizing the cost of imple-
menting each effort then choosing most profitable effort. Note that a∗(H) = a1 implies
that a∗(L) = a1 since the expected payoff from the agent’s effort is strictly higher for
they type-H principal. Thus if a∗(H) = a1, wˆ(a(H);H) = (h(U¯ + a1), h(U¯ + a1))
which satisfies all the constraints of IRSW given our previous statement.
If a∗(H) = a2 and PIC(a∗(L);L) does not bind, the solution to IRSW is simply
w∗(a∗(H);H) which exists by our previous argument. Otherwise, the solution to
IRSW is defined by
(piHs(a2)− piHs(a1))
[
U(wHs )− U(wHf )
]
= a2 − a1, and (2.3)∑
n∈{s,f}
piLn (a
∗(L)) [qn − wn (a∗(L))] =
∑
n∈{s,f}
piLn(a2)
(
qn − wHn
)
. (2.4)
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Equation (2.3) implicitly defines a strictly increase line in (ws, wf )-space while equa-
tion (2.4) defines a strictly decreasing line in (ws, wf )-space. These lines there-
fore intersect exactly once in R2. Denote this intersection point (w′s, w′f ). If this
(w′s, w
′
f ) ∈ [w,∞)2 we are done: wˆ(a2;H) = (w′s, w′f ) . Otherwise, the solution is
w∗(a;L) = (w′′s , w) where w
′′
s satisfies equation (2.3) with w
H
f = w.
Since
∑
n
piHn (aˆ(H)) [qn − wˆn (aˆ(H);H)] >
∑
n
piHn (a
∗(L)) [qn − wn (a∗(L);L)]
the expected payoff to the type-H principal is strictly higher under the RSW menu-
contract than lower bound point contract. The type-L principal is just as well off.
Therefore, the ex ante payoff to the principal of the RSW menu is strictly greater
than the ex ante point-contract lower bound payoff equilibrium payoff.
Let PPS be the set of ex ante equilibrium payoffs for the principal that can be
earned via separating separating point contracts. Define PMS similarly. Our next
result characterizes environment such that PMS is strictly higher than P
P
S in the
strong set ordering except at the RSW payoff. I first make the following assumptions.
Assumption 2.1 (a)
∑
n∈{s,f} piHn(a1)qn ≥ h(U¯ + a1) for both i ∈ {H,L};
(b)
∑
n∈{s,f} piHn(a2) (qn − wˆ(a2;H)) ≥
∑
n∈{s,f} piHn(a1)(qn − h(U¯ + a1));
(c) PIC(a∗(L);L,H) does not hold if the type-H principal implements a∗(H) with
w∗(a∗(H);H); and
(d) piHs(a2)− piHs(a1) > piLs(a2)− piLs(a1).
Part (a) ensures that revenues are such that it is always (weakly) profitable for the
principal to hire the agent. Part (b) ensures that the type-H principal will prefer
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to implement a2 at the least-cost separating equilibrium. Parts (a) and (b) are only
necessary to exclude uninteresting equilibria in which the agent is not hired or she is
hired to exert minimal effort. Part (c) ensures that the first best (i.e. full information)
contract cannot be implemented; in particular, in trying to do so, the type-L principal
would try to mimic the type-H principal. Thus, under this assumption, there is
inefficiency in the least-cost separating equilibrium. Part (d) ensures a separating
equilibrium exists.
2.4.1 Separating Equilibria
Our next proposition gives a necessary and sufficient condition such that under As-
sumption 2.1, equilibrium payoffs can be obtained using menu-contracts which are
strictly higher than any separating equilibrium payoff using point contracts.
Proposition 2.2 If Assumption 1 holds, then PPS and P
M
S intersect only at the
RSW (or least-cost separating) equilibrium payoff and there exist a payoff v ∈ PMS
such that v > λU(H) + (1− λ)U(L) if and only if
h
(
U¯ + a(L)− (a(L)− a1)piLs(a2)
piLs(a2)− piLs(a1)
)
> w. (2.5)
Proof The proposition is a result of the following lemma that proves that (2.5) is a
necessary and sufficient condition for menu-contracts to deliver higher ex ante payoff
to the principal than any separating point-contract.
Lemma 2.2 If Assumption 1 holds, there exists an equilibrium in menu-contracts
that gives higher payoffs to both principal types than the least-cost separating equilib-
rium in point-contracts if and only if (2.5) holds.
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To see why this lemma holds, note that
w∗f (a
∗(L);L) = h
(
U¯ + a2 − (a2 − a1)piLs(a2)
piLs(a2)− piLs(a1)
)
and observe Figure 2.1 (note that a contract that implements effort a∗(L) must be
below the curve wf,AIC and above the curve wf,IR). In panel (a), the least costly
contract that implements a∗(L) is strictly interior. As we have noted, in the least
cost separating equilibrium the type-H principal gives the agent utility strictly greater
than her reservation utility. Moreover, separation requires the type-H principal to
increase the cost of her contract to dissuade the type-L principal from mimicking
her. Using menu-contracts and the inscrutability principle, we can transfer some
of the rents ceded to the agent by the type-H principal to the type-L principal,
effectively shifting her individual rationality constraint down, allowing the type-L
principal to offer a less costly contract and earn more profits. This eases the incentive
compatibility constraint between the principals, allowing the type-H principal to
make her contract less costly and earn more profits herself.
On the other hand, if condition (2.5) fails, as in panel (b) of Figure 2.1, relaxing
the type-L principal’s individual rationality constraint does not generate a less costly
contract for her to offer.
Proof Sufficiency. Suppose the a∗(L) = a2. The contract w∗(a2;L) is the unique
solution to
piLf (a2)U(wf ) + piLs(a2)U(ws) = U¯ + a2 (2.6)
(piLf (a2)− piLf (a1))U(wf ) + (piLs(a2)− piLs(a1))U(ws) = a2 − a1. (2.7)
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(a) Condition (2.5) is satisfied. (b) Condition (2.5) is not satisfied.
Figure 2.1: Examples of when condition (2.5) is and isn’t satisfied.
Solving (3.7) and (2.7) we get
w∗f (a2;L) = h
(
U¯ + a2 − (a2 − a1)piLs(a2)
piLs(a2)− piLs(a1)
)
> w
by assumption.
By hypothesis
piHs(a2)
piHf (a2)
>
piLs(a2)
piLf (a2)
and it is clear that w∗s(a2;H) > w
∗
f (a2;H). Thus we can apply Lemma 1 of Silvers [10]
to conclude that IR(a2; {1, 0}) is satisfied with strict inequality: when the principal’s
type is her private information, in the least cost separating equilibrium the principal
of type-H cedes rents to the agent ex ante. Thus,
∆ :=
λ
2(1− λ)
[∑
n
piHnU(wˆn)− a2 − U¯
]
> 0.
Since for menu-contracts individual rationality only needs to be satisfied in expecta-
tion, we can transfer the half of rents ceded to the agent from the principal of type-H
to the principal of type-L, essentially relaxing her individual rationality constraint by
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∆. The type-L principal’s contract can then be solved as the unique solution to (2.7)
and
piLf (a
∗(L))U(wf ) + piLs(a∗(L)U(ws) = U¯ + a∗(L)−∆. (2.8)
I can solve (3.7), (2.7) and (2.8) for wf as a function of ws:
wf,AIR(ws) = h
(
U¯ + a2 − piLs(a2)U(ws)
piLf (a2)
)
wf,AIC(ws) = h
(
U(ws)− a2 − a1
(piLs(a2)− piLs(a1))
)
wf,IR∆(ws) = h
(
U¯ + a2 −∆− piLs(a2)U(ws)
piLf (a2)
)
.
Taking the derivative of wf,AIC(ws):
w′f,AIC(ws) = h
′
(
U(ws)− a2 − a1
(piLs(a2)− piLs(a1))
)
U ′(ws) > 0.
Note that w∗(a2;L) is the solution to wf,IR(ws) = wf,AIC(ws); that is,
wf,IR∆(w
∗
s(a2;L)) = wf,AIC(w
∗
s(a2;L))
= w∗f (a2;L).
Let w˜(a2;L) be the solution to wf,IR∆(ws) = wf,AIC(ws) if w˜f (a2;L) ≥ w and
w˜(a2;L) := (w,wf,IR∆(w)) otherwise. Since wf,AIC(ws) is decreasing and wf,IR∆ < wf,IR ,
we have w˜(a2;L)  w∗(a2;L).6 Thus, w˜(a2;L) implements a2 at a lower cost than
w∗(a2;L).
6If a and b are two vectors of the same size, a  b indicates that each element of a is strictly
less than each element of b.
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Meanwhile, at w˜(a2;L), the constraint PIC(a
∗(L);L) is relaxed (since the type-L
principal now implements a∗(L) at a lower cost and therefore receives a higher payoff)
and therefore the type-H principal can implement her effort at a lower cost. Thus,
both types of the principal are strictly better off.
If a∗(L) = a1, then w∗f (a1;L) = w
∗
s(a1;L) = h(U¯ + a1). Let z = min{U¯ + a1, w}.
Then w˜f (a1;L) = w˜s(a1;L) = h(z) implements a1 in menu-contracts. As before
at w˜(a1;L), the constraint PIC(a
∗(L);L) is relaxed (since the type-L principal now
implements a∗(L) at a lower cost and therefore receives a higher payoff) and therefore
the type-H principal can implement her effort at a lower cost. Thus, both types of
the principal are strictly better off.
Necessity. To show necessity, suppose that w∗f (a
∗(L), 2) = w. By definition,
wf,AIC(w
∗
s(a
∗(L);L)) = w.
But then, since wf,AIC is strictly increasing, there is no w˜s that implements a
∗(L)
such that w˜s < w
∗
s(a
∗(L);L), even for the relaxed individual rationality constraint.
So the least cost contract that implements a∗(L) remains (w,w∗s(a
∗(L);L)).
2.4.2 Pooling Equilibria
In any complete pooling equilibrium with contract C, the agent’s posterior is her
prior: ρ(C) = (λ, 1− λ). The high effort complete pooling contract wp is the defined
by
(λδH + (1− λ)δL)
[
U(wps)− U(wpf )
]
= a2 − a1 and∑
n∈{s,f}
[(
λpiHn(a2) + (1− λ)piLn(a2)
)
wpn −
(
U¯ + a2
)]
.
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Contract wp exists since the first equation is strictly increasing and the second is
strictly decreasing in (ws, wf ) space (possibly needing to enforce the lower bound
wage w). Define δi := piis(a2)− piis(a1) for i ∈ {H,L}.
Assumption 2.2 (a) wp ∈ (w,∞);
(b)
∑
n∈{s,f} piLn(a2)(qn − wpn) ≥
∑
n∈{s,f} piLn(a2)
(
qn − h
(
U¯ + a1
))
;
(c) U is strictly concave.
Part (a) of Assumption 2 requires the solution to be interior. This is guaranteed if
δH and δL are sufficiently large (i.e. if high effort is sufficiently worthwhile). Part (b)
ensures that the type-L (and hence the type-H) principal prefers to implement high
effort in the pooling contract. This is guaranteed if qs is sufficiently large.
Proposition 2.3 Suppose Assumption 1 parts (a) and (c) and Assumption 2 hold.
There exists δ¯ such that if δL − δH ∈ (0, δ¯), then there exists a menu-contract that is
more profitable for the principal ex-ante than the complete pooling contract for any
λ ∈ (0, 1).
The condition for the proposition are satisfied, for example, for U(·) = ln(·) or
U(·) = √·,
piHs = 0.9
piLs = 0.8
δH = 0.45
δL = 0.6
and any costs of effort a1 < a2 and any reservation U¯ such that revenues satisfy Part
(b) of Assumption 2.
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Proof Let wp denote the complete pooling contract. Define
Kip := piis(a2)w
p
s + piif (a2)w
p
f .
Define a menu-contract {wH ,wL} that satisfies
piis(a2)w
i
s + piif (a2)w
i
f = K
i
p and (2.9)
(piis(a2)− piis(a1))
[
U(wis)− U(wif )
]
= a2 − a1. (2.10)
I claim that
λ
(
piHs(a2)U(w
H
s ) + piHf (a2)U(w
H
f )
)
+(1−λ) (piLs(a2)U(wLs ) + piLf (a2)U(wLf )) > U¯+a2
(2.11)
if the conditions in the proposition are met. Thus, {wH ,wL} constitutes a menu-
contract that provides the agent with more (ex ante) utility than is needed for her
to agree to the contract. I can reduce wages wH by an amount that is small enough
such that the principal’s incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied. This new
contract is thus strictly preferred to wp.
The pooling equilibrium solves the following problem:
Kip(λ) =

min
w
∑
n∈{s,f} piin(a)wn
subject to AIC(a; {λ, 1− λ})
AIR(a; {λ, 1− λ})
. (P)
Since both constraints are linear in λ, Kip must be concave in λ.
I will use the following lemma below.
Lemma 2.3 wHs > w
L
s > w
L
f > w
H
s .
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Proof Since both constraints in problem (P) bind
∑
n∈{s,f}
[(
λ (piHn(a2)− piHn(a1)) + (1− λ) (piLn(a2)− piLn(a1)
)
U(wn)− (a2 − a1)
]
= (λδH + (1− λ)δL)
[
U(wps)− U(wpf )
]− (a2 − a1).
Since δH < λδH + (1 − λ)δL either wHs > wps , wHf < wpf or both. By equation (2.9),
wHs > w
p
s if and only if w
H
f > w
p
f . Thus, we have both w
H
s > w
p
s and w
H
f < w
p
f .
Similarly, since δL > λδH + (1− λ)δL we have both wHs < wps and wHf > wpf .
Using (2.9) and (2.10), we can rewrite the left hand side of (2.11) as follows
λ
(
piHs(a2)U(w
H
s ) + piHf (a2)U(w
H
f )
)
+ (1− λ) (piLs(a2)U(wLs ) + piLf (a2)U(wLf ))
= (a2 − a1)
(
λpiHs
∆H
+
(1− λ)piLs
∆2
)
+ λU(wHf ) + (1− λ)U(wLf )
= U¯ + a2 −
[
U¯ + a2 − (a2 − a1)
(
λpiHs
∆H
+
(1− λ)piLs
∆2
)]
+ λU(wHf ) + (1− λ)U(wLf )
= U¯ + a2 −
[
λ
(
U¯ + a2 − (a2 − a1)piHs
∆H
)
+ (1− λ)
(
U¯ + a2 − (a2 − a1)piLs
∆2
)]
+ λU(wHf ) + (1− λ)U(wLf )
= U¯ + a2 + λU(w
H
f ) + (1− λ)U(wLf )− λU(w∗f (a2;H))− (1− λ)U(w∗f (a2;L))
(2.12)
=: S(λ).
I claim that S(λ) is a concave function. To see this note
S ′′(λ) = 2
(
∂U(wHf (λ))
∂λ
− ∂U(w
L
f (λ))
∂λ
)
+ λ
∂2U(wHf (λ))
∂λ2
+ (1− λ)∂
2U(wLf (λ))
∂λ2
.
(2.13)
The following lemma shows that the first term in (2.13) is negative.
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Lemma 2.4
dU(wif (λ))
dλ
<
dU(wif (λ))
dλ
.
Proof The Lagrangean of problem (P) is
∑
n∈{s,f}
piin(a)wn + θAIC
∑
n∈{s,f}
[(
λ (piHn(a2)− piHs(a1))
+ (1− λ) (piLn(a2)− piLn(a1)
)
U(wn)− (a2 − a1)
]
+ θIR
∑
n∈{s,f}
[(
λpiHn(a2) + (1− λ)piLn(a2)
)
wn − U¯
]
.
where θAIC and θIR are (non-positive) Lagrange multipliers for the first and second
constraints in problem (P) respectively. By the envelope theorem (see Milgrom and
Segal [6]),
dKip(λ)
dλ
=θAIC (δH − δL)
(
U(wps(λ))− U(wpf (λ))
)
+ θIR
(
piHs(a2)− piLs(a2)
) (
U(wps(λ))− U(wpf (λ))
)
. (2.14)
Since both constraints are binding, θAIC , θIR < 0. Thus, if δH−δL is not too negative,
Kip(λ) is decreasing. Further, by equation (2.10) the sign of
dwin(λ)
dλ
must be the same
for all n ∈ {s, f} and all i ∈ {H,L}. Therefore, since Kip(λ) is decreasing, dw
i
n(λ)
dλ
< 0
for all n ∈ {s, f} and all i ∈ {H,L}. Note that (2.14) does not depend on i.
Taking the total derivative of (2.10) and rearranging we get
dU(wis(λ))
dλ
− dU(w
i
f (λ))
dλ
= U ′(wis)
dwis(λ)
dλ
− U ′(wif )
dwif (λ)
dλ
= 0.
Since wis > w
i
f and U is concave, it must be that
dwis(λ)
dλ
>
dwif (λ)
dλ
.
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Further
U ′(wHs )
dwHs (λ)
dλ
− U ′(wHf )
dwHf (λ)
dλ
= U ′(wLs )
dwLs (λ)
dλ
− U ′(wLf )
dwLf (λ)
dλ
⇔
U ′(wHs )
dwHs (λ)
dλ
− U ′(wLs )
dwLs (λ)
dλ
= U ′(wHf )
dwHf (λ)
dλ
− U ′(wLf )
dwLf (λ)
dλ
(2.15)
U ′(wLs )
(
dwHs (λ)
dλ
− dw
L
s (λ)
dλ
)
< U ′(wHf )
(
dwHf (λ)
dλ
− dw
L
f (λ)
dλ
)
(2.16)
where the inequality follows since U is concave and wHs > w
L
s and w
H
f < w
L
f .
Now, taking the total derivative of (2.9) and applying the observation that
dKHp (λ)
dλ
=
dKLp (λ)
dλ
=: K¯
we get
piHs(a2)
dwHs (λ)
dλ
+ piHf (a2)
dwHf (λ)
dλ
= piLs(a2)
dwLs (λ)
dλ
+ piLf (a2)
dwLf (λ)
dλ
.
Thus, either dw
H
s (λ)
dλ
< dw
L
s (λ)
dλ
or
dwHf (λ)
dλ
<
dwLf (λ)
dλ
or both. From inequality (2.16), we
conclude that dw
H
s (λ)
dλ
< dw
L
s
dλ
(otherwise we contradict the previous statement). By
equation (2.15)
U ′(wHf )
dwHf (λ)
dλ
− U ′(wLf )
dwLf (λ)
dλ
< U ′(wHs )
wHs (λ)
dλ
− U ′(wHf )
wLs (λ)
dλ
< U ′(wHs )
wHs (λ)
dλ
− U ′(wHf )
wHf (λ)
dλ
= 0
where the first inequality follows since wHf < w
L
s (see Lemma 2.3) and the second
follows since
dwHf (λ)
dλ
<
dwHs (λ)
dλ
<
dwLs (λ)
dλ
.
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Thus,
dU
(
wif (λ)
)
dλ
<
dU
(
wif (λ)
)
dλ
as needed.
Lemma 2.5 U
(
wif (λ)
)
is concave.
Proof Suppose not: U
(
wif (λ)
)
is convex. Then, since U is concave, wif (λ) must be
convex. Further, rearranging (2.10) we have
U
(
wis(λ)
)
=
a2 − a1
piis(a2)− piif (a1) + U
(
wif (λ)
)
so that U (wis(λ)) must also be convex. Again, since U is concave w
i
s(λ) must be
convex. Thus piis(a2)w
i
s(λ) + piif (a2)w
i
f (λ) is convex. But
piis(a2)w
i
s(λ) + piif (a2)w
i
f (λ) = K
i
p
and, as we noted above, Kip is concave. Thus we have a contradiction.
By the previous two lemmata S(λ) is concave. Further, since
S(0) = S(1) = U¯ + a2,
inequality (2.11) holds for all λ ∈ (0, 1).
2.5 Conclusion
I have shown that allowing menu-contracts instead of just point-contracts increases
the set of equilibrium payoffs in the strong set ordering and that allowing menu-
contract eliminates many poor equilibria for the principal; in particular, the principal
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will never obtain less than her least-cost separating equilibrium payoff when offering
menu-contracts. Additionally, I characterize environments where equilibrium payoffs
can be obtained using menu-contracts which are strictly higher than any separating
equilibrium payoff using point-contracts. Thus, in a labour market environment with
moral hazard where the employer has private information about the productivity
of the worker, this paper shows that it can be strictly beneficial for the employer
to maintain discretion over the particulars of the contract after the employer has
accepted the job; moreover, the employer can never do worse by maintaining this
discretion.
Extending the space of efforts and outcomes to any finitely countable set would
be straight forward since none of my results depend on there being only two efforts
and two outcomes.
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Chapter 3
A Note on Bidder-Led Collusion
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I present an example of a discrete, independent private-value auction
in which a bidder (the proposer) can offer her rival (the receiver) a collusion contract
after agreeing to the seller’s mechanism. A celebrated result by Che and Kim [5]
states that for such auctions, there is a mechanism that eliminates all the effects
of collusion. The example demonstrates that the mechanism developed by Che and
Kim [5] fails to raise the seller her Myerson payoff; that is, the payoff the seller
would earn if collusion were impossible. The Che and Kim mechanism essentially
calls for the seller to charge entrance fees to the bidders that sum to the Myerson
payoff and leave the task of allocating the good to the colluding coalition. In my
example, the expected entrance fee is higher than the expected value of the good for
some lower type bidders; to ensure participation of these types in the Che and Kim
mechanism, higher type bidders must provide sufficient compensation. The proposal
my bidder offers refuses to pay this compensation when she is a higher type and
therefore excludes the lower types of her rivals from participating in the mechanism
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and reduces the seller’s mechanism. This proposal, and the off equilibrium behaviour
that supports it, is shown to dominate the proposer’s strategy of playing the Che and
Kim mechanism truthfully.
I show further that there is no symmetric mechanism that achieves the Myerson
payoff in a discrete, independent, private-value auction in which a bidder can offer
a collusion contract to her rival. To see why this is true, note that any mechanism
that collects more than the low valuation of the good when both bidders have low
valuations is susceptible to the same type of collusion as Che and Kim’s mechanism.
I then show that any mechanism that collects less than the low valuation of the good
when both bidders have low valuations is susceptible to collusion whereby the bidders
always announce they have low valuations.
The model differs from Che and Kim’s in two ways. First, the offer of collusion
is made by a bidder rather than a third party. Second, the reservation utility of the
bidder who receives the collusion offer is determined endogenously, i.e. via equilibrium
play in the seller’s mechanism following rejection of the collusion proposal; this is in
contrast to the assumption of Che and Kim that the lowest level of utility the collusion
contract must offer to ensure participation cannot be lower than the receiver’s initial
reservation utility level – that is, the level of utility that the seller’s mechanism must
deliver to ensure participation.
Once we rid ourselves of the assumption that a third party is organizing collusion,
we are able to consider how the proposer determines her off-path play in order to
maximize her payoff within the seller’s mechanism. This allows me to pin down the
most reasonable equilibrium play in the seller’s mechanism. I find that one type of
the proposer is indifferent between truth-telling and lying in the off-path subgame
following rejection of her collusion proposal, but that she strictly prefers the equi-
librium outcome of the mechanism when she lies. Thus, if dominated strategies are
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ruled out, any equilibrium we consider should break the indifference in this subgame
in favour of lying. This highlights the importance of the second difference between
the current chapter and Che and Kim’s model. The credible threat of lying to the
seller’s mechanism reduces the utility of one of the receiver’s types below her initial
reservation value. Anticipating the actions of the proposer before agreeing to the
seller’s mechanism, this type of the receiver will refuse to participate and therefore
reduce the expected payoff of the seller.
Finally, I outline the bidder’s general problem for designing an optimal collusion
contract.
3.2 Literature Review
There is a large theoretical literature studying collusion. The current chapter be-
longs to a strand of this literature that studies collusion that is explicitly agreed to
by the relevant parties via an enforceable contract. This literature has its genesis in
McAfee and McMillan [16] who characterize the optimal collusion mechanism, orga-
nized by a benevolent and uninformed third-party who maximizes the sum of bidder’s
payoffs, when the seller’s mechanism is fixed to be a first-price auction.
Laffont and Martimort [11, 12] extend this analysis by endogenizing the principal’s
mechanism, allowing her to respond optimally to any potential collusion contract. In
problems of regulating firms and providing public goods, Laffont and Martimort show
that the principal is able to exploit the constraints imposed on the agents’ collusion
contract given their private information to minimize the effects of collusion on revenue.
Che and Kim [5] significantly extend the framework of Laffont and Martimort.
Quesada [15] studies agent-led collusion in a procurement/public goods setting
where the principal has a Leontief production function. She finds that the principal
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can achieve her Myerson payoff when the agents’ types are uncorrelated. However, it
is unclear how much the result depends on the principal’s production technology. The
Leontief function implies that the agents’ actions are perfect complements, whereas
in an auction setting, bidders’ actions are perfect substitutes.
Laffont and Martimort [11, 12] and Che and Kim [5] assume, as in this chapter,
that the collusion contract is designed only after all bidders have agreed to partic-
ipate in principal’s mechanism. A number of more recent papers (see for example,
Dequiedt [7]; Pavlov [14]; and Che and Kim [6]) have studied the collusion problem
when agents can collude prior to entering the principal’s mechanism. Notably, the
ability to collude on participation decision strengthens the ability of the colluders
to extract rents from the principal. Relatedly, Eso˝ and Schummer [8] and Rach-
milevitch [17] look at a particular collusive mechanism: the ability to bribe rivals to
abstain from a second-price and a first-price auction respectively.
A second strand of the literature studies how collusion can be sustained via re-
peated games, both with and without tacit communication between bidders (see for
example Fudenberg, Lavine and Maskin [9]; Athey and Bagwell [2]; Aoyagi [1]; Athey,
Bagwell and Sanchirico [3]; and Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn [18]). In a similar vein,
Garratt, Tro¨ger and Zheng [10] examine how bidders are able to collude in auctions
by participating in resale markets following the initial auction.
Finally, the bidder-led organization of collusion studied this chapter is similar to
the process of reciprocal contracting studied by Celik and Peters [4]. Their contracting
procedure has all players of the game offering contracts that are each conditional on
the contracts offered by the others; if all contracts agree, a cooperative action is
implemented in the default game (e.g. an auction); otherwise, all contracts are void
and the default game is played non-cooperatively. Their work is mostly concerned
with characterizing the outcomes that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibria
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of the reciprocal contracting game. While they do suggest how the procedure can
be used to model collusion, much of the analysis of the problem is left for future
research. The reciprocal contracting approach to modelling collusion is best viewed
as complementary to the bidder-led collusion studied in this chapter since it too
dispenses with the assumption that a third-party organizes collusion.
3.3 The Model
Consider a seller facing two potential bidders of one unit of a good. Buyers have
private information about their valuation of the good; valuations for bidder i’s val-
uation vi is drawn independently from some arbitrary measurable set Ti. Valua-
tions for bidder i are distributed according to some distribution Fi ∈ ∆Ti. The
seller offers mechanism M =
{
(qi(·), ti(·))2i=1
}
where qi : T1 × T2 → [0, 1], such that
q1(v1, v2)+q2(v1, v2) ≤ 1 for all (v1, v2) ∈ T1×T2, maps valuations into the probability
that bidder i obtains the good and ti : T1×T2 → R maps valuations into the payment
to be made from bidder i to the seller.
An allocation (q1, q2, t1, t2) with draw (v1, v2) ∈ T1 × T2 gives utility ui(θ1, θ2) :=
viqi − ti to bidder i and w(θ1, θ2) := t1 + t2 to the seller. The reservation payoff for
each player is 0.
After both players have accepted the seller’s mechanism, we allow bidder 1 to
offer a collusion contract to bidder 2. Formally, a collusion contract is a set P ={
m, (φi(·))2i=1 , y(·)
}
where m ⊆ T1 × T2 is a set of messages bidder 1 allows to be
exchanged between bidder 1 and bidder 2; φi : T1 × T2 → T1 × T2 maps the types of
the bidders into a report to the seller for bidder i and y : T1 × T2 → R maps the types
of the bidders into transfers from bidder 2 to bidder 1.1
1Due to the specification of preferences, any reallocation of the good can be replicated via
transfers between the bidders. There is therefore no loss of generality in not allowing the collusion
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The timeline of the full game is as follows:
1. Seller offers mechanism M .
2. Bidders accept or reject seller’s mechanism.
3. If both reject, all players receive reservation utility and the game ends; if one
rejects, the seller’s mechanism is played with the bidder who accepted.
4. If both accept, bidder 1 offers bidder 2 collusion contract P .
5. Bidder 2 accepts or rejects.
6. If bidder 2 rejects, bidders play seller’s mechanism non-cooperatively.
7. If bidder 2 accepts:
(a) the bidders simultaneously make announcements from m to each other;
(b) the bidders announce type to seller (i.e. play seller’s mechanism); and
(c) the transfer is made between bidders.
Before outlining the general contract design problem of bidder 1, I present a
discrete type example to demonstrate how Che and Kim’s [5] mechanism is susceptible
to collusion and develop some of the central problems to studying bidder-led collusion.
3.4 Discrete Type Example
Let T1 = T2 = {vL, vH} with vH > vL. For convenience, I say buyer i with valuation
vθi has type θi where θi ∈ {L,H}. Each bidder draws valuation vH with probability
α. Define ∆v := vH − vL.
contract to reallocate the good.
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Assume that vL − α1−α∆v > 0; then the optimal allocation for the seller in the
absence of collusion is to sell in all states of the world. In this case, the seller earns
payoff α · vH + (1− α) · vL. This is the seller’s Myerson payoff (i.e. the highest payoff
she can achieve given her lack of knowledge of the bidder’s types).
Suppose the bidders can collude via a benevolent third party who maximizes a
weighted sum of their payoffs. Buyers reveal their types to the third party who can
then manipulate these reports to the seller, reallocate q assigned by the seller and
exchange transfers among the bidders in a budget balanced way. Che and Kim [5]
show that the seller can still achieve her Myerson payoff and implement the Myerson
allocation.
Proposition 3.1 Let ρ := (α · vH + (1− α) · vL) /2. The following quantity and
transfer schedules achieve the Myerson allocation:
q(H,H) =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
, q(H,L) = (1, 0),
q(L,H) = (0, 1), q(L,L) =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
,
t(H,H) = (ρ, ρ), t(H,L) =
(
ρ+ 1
2
vH , ρ− 12vH
)
,
t(L,H) =
(
ρ− 1
2
vH , ρ+
1
2
vH
)
, t(L,L) = (ρ, ρ).
The resulting expected payoffs are
Ui(H) := Eθj(ui(100, θj)) = vH/2− ρ
Ui(L) := Eθj(ui(50, θj)) = 0.
for j 6= i; i, j ∈ {1, 2}. The seller achieves her Myerson payoff of α · vH + (1−α) · vL.
I will refer to the mechanism in Proposition 3.1 as the Che-Kim mechanism and
its outcome as the Che-Kim outcome.
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Now suppose that, instead of having a third-party propose a collusion contract,
bidder 1 can offer bidder 2 a collusion contract after both have accepted the seller’s
mechanism. It is natural to consider the forward looking incentives of bidder 1 when
determining off-path decisions and pinning down a reasonable equilibrium; in particu-
lar, we are interested in how bidder 1 plays in the seller’s mechanism in the event that
bidder 2 rejects her collusion proposal. An equilibrium satisfies the forward induction
criterion if the associated equilibrium of the normal form representation of the game
is composed of undominated strategies.
Theorem 3.1 No equilibrium of the Che-Kim mechanism satisfies the forward in-
duction criterion and earns the seller her Myerson payoff when bidder 1 can make a
collusion offer to bidder 2.
I first determine the reservation payoff of bidder 2 in the collusion contract game.
Lemma 3.1 There exists an equilibrium in the Che-Kim mechanism such that type
H of bidder 2 earns u¯2(vH) :=
1
2
vH−ρ and type L of bidder 2 earns u¯2(vL) := 12vL−ρ.
Proof Note that when bidder 2 is being truthful, type H of bidder 1 is indifferent
between lying and telling the truth in the Che-Kim mechanism. Further, given that
bidder 1 is lying, being truthful remains a best response for bidder 2. Thus, we have
an equilibrium in the Che-Kim mechanism where bidder 1 always announces that she
is type L and bidder 2 plays a truthful strategy. In case bidder 2 is type H, her utility
is vH − 12vH − ρ = 12vH − ρ; in case she is type L her utility is 12 · vL − ρ.
Thus, upon rejection of the collusion contract, if the equilibrium of Lemma 3.1 is
played, the low type of bidder 2 obtains payoff 1
2
· vL− ρ. Supposing this equilibrium
is played upon rejection then the collusion contract offered by bidder 1 must provide
at least 1
2
· vL − ρ for the low type of bidder 2 to be acceptable to her. Note that
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1
2
·vL−ρ < 0 and therefore delivers to type L of bidder 2 less than her initial reservation
utility. Che and Kim [5] explicitly rule out any collusive mechanism that delivers to
the bidders utility less than their utility from rejecting the seller’s mechanism. Since
the collusive contract generates a payoff for bidder 2 that is less than this outside
option, it cannot be considered in Che and Kim’s analysis. This restriction implicitly
rules out the equilibrium where bidder 1 follows the strategy described in the previous
lemma.
I now present a collusion contract that bidder 1 can offer bidder 2. Next, I
show that the strategy of making this offer and always announcing L in the seller’s
mechanism following bidder 2’s rejection of the offer dominates the truthful strategy
leading to the Che-Kim outcome for bidder 1.
Lemma 3.2 There is an equilibrium in the Che-Kim mechanism where Buyer 1 offers
a collusion contract such that both bidders tell the truth and the low type of bidder
2 transfers 1
2
∆v to the high type of bidder 1. In case of rejection, bidder 1 always
announces L to the seller and bidder 2 is truthful.
The resulting expected payoffs are
U1(H) = α
1
2
vH + (1− α)
(
vH − 12vL
)− ρ, U1(L) = 0,
U2(H) = vH/2− ρ, U2(L) = vL/2− ρ.
Proof Incentive Compatibility For bidder 1 of type H:
α · vH · 1
2
+ (1− α)
(
vH − 1
2
vL
)
≥ α · vH · 1
2
+ (1− α) · vH · 1
2
=
1
2
vH ;
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for bidder 1 of type L:
α
1
2
vH + (1− α)1
2
vL
≥ α
(
vL − 1
2
vL
)
+ (1− α)1
2
vL =
1
2
vL.
For bidder 2 of type H:
α
1
2
vH + (1− α)
(
vH − 1
2
vH
)
=
1
2
vH
≥ α1
2
vL + (1− α)1
2
vH .
for bidder 2 of type L:
α
1
2
vL + (1− α)vL = 1
2
vL
≥ α1
2
vL + (1− α)
(
vL − 1
2
vH
)
.
It is clear that the offer is individually rational for bidder 2 given that the equilibrium
from Lemma 3.1 is played following rejection.
Lemma 3.3 Any equilibrium where bidder 1 tells the truth following the rejection of
any collusion proposal is dominated by the strategy of offering the collusion contract
of Lemma 3.2 and announcing type L in the seller’s mechanism following rejection
of her offer.
Proof For bidder 1, any strategy that prescribes being truthful in the Che-Kim
mechanism is weakly dominated by offering the collusive contract and lying (i.e.
always announcing she is L) following rejection of the collusive contract. To see this,
note that the latter earns type H of bidder 1 utility of α 1
2
vH+(1−α)
(
vH − 12vL
)−ρ >
1
2
vH − ρ (where 12vH − ρ is her utility in the Che-Kim outcome) if type L of bidder
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2 accepts the collusion contract and 1
2
vH − ρ otherwise. A truthful strategy for type
H of bidder 1 following rejection earns her utility 1
2
vH − ρ. Type L of bidder 1 earns
the entrance fee in both cases.
Finally, I can show that there is no equilibrium of the Che-Kim mechanism that
satisfies the forward induction criterion and achieves the Myerson payoff for the seller.
We know from the previous lemma that any equilibrium that satisfies the forward in-
duction criterion in the Che-Kim mechanism will give the low type of bidder 2 strictly
less than her reservation payoff; thus the low type of bidder 2 will not participate in
the seller’s mechanism. In the two states in which bidder 2 is of the low type the seller
only obtains the entrance fee from bidder 1. An upper bound on expected revenue
for the seller is
α2 (α · vH + (1− α) · vL) + α(1− α) ((α · vH + (1− α) · vL)/2)
+ (1− α)α (α · vH + (1− α) · vL) + (1− α)2 ((α · vH + (1− α) · vL)/2)
< α · vH + (1− α) · vL.
A mechanism M offered by bidder 1 is safe if for every type of bidder 1, M
is incentive compatible and individually rational if bidder 2 knew the principal’s
type. See Myerson [13]. A safe mechanism has the advantage that regardless of the
inferences made by bidder 2 about bidder 1 when bidder 1 offers a mechanism, that
mechanism will be accepted by bidder 2.
Proposition 3.2 Buyer 1’s collusion offer (from Proposition 3.2) is a safe mecha-
nism.
Proof Suppose that bidder 2 believes with probability β ∈ [0, 1] that bidder 1 is of the
high type. The high type of bidder 2 expects payoff of β 1
2
vH+(1−β)12vL−ρ = 12vL−ρ
while the low type expects a payoff of β 1
2
vL + (1−β)12vL− ρ = 12vL− ρ. Truth telling
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remains a best response for bidder 2: for bidder 2 of type H:
vH
1
2
− ρ ≥ 1
2
vLβ +
1
2
vH(1− β)− ρ;
for bidder 2 of type L:
1
2
vL − ρ ≥ 1
2
vLβ + (vL − 1
2
vH)− ρ.
Since the collusion offer is safe, it cannot be ruled out by any refinement of equi-
libria that restricts β following acceptance of the collusive offer. Moreover, if the
high type of bidder 1 augments his offer with a small acceptance bonus of  > 0 for
bidder 2, for any beliefs β ∈ (0, 1], acceptance of the offer is strictly optimal (for
β = 0 bidder 2 is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer). Further, note
that the proposal requires no exchange of information between the bidders: bidder
1 can determine bidder 2’s report to the seller, and therefore her type, through the
allocation of the good and the payment made to the seller; thus knowing bidder 2’s
type, bidder 1 can extract the appropriate payment from bidder 2.
I have noted that the equilibrium proposed in the Che-Kim mechanism satisfies
the forward induction criterion; in particular, the strategy of announcing L following
rejection is maximal for bidder 1 regardless of bidder 2’s action. This relies on the
fact that type H of bidder 1 is indifferent between announcing H and L following
rejection. The seller could then break this indifference with a small extra payment
to any bidder who announces H. The equilibrium no longer satisfies the forward
induction criterion and our argument that it is a likely outcome breaks down. Thus,
one could argue that the seller can get arbitrarily close to her Myerson payoff with
such a scheme. However, the collusion equilibrium could just as reasonably be said
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to be arbitrarily close to satisfying the forward induction criterion, thus restoring the
argument for choosing such an equilibrium.
Finally, note that the game could be modified such that the bidder who is able
to offer the collusion contract is chosen at random after having entered the grand
mechanism. The low type of bidder i will obtain payoff 0 if she is chosen to make
the offer and 1
2
vL − ρ otherwise. Any expectation over these payoffs is less than
the entrance fee so low types of both bidders will refuse to participate, therefore
maintaining the statement of the corollary.
3.4.1 Impossibility of Earning Myerson Payoff with Symmet-
ric Mechanisms
In this section I show that there is no symmetric mechanism that guarantees the
seller earns her Myerson payoff in expectation. We define a symmetric mechanism
such that t¯ := t1(H,H) = t2(H,H); t := t1(L,L) = t2(L,L); tLH := t1(L,H) =
t2(H,L); tHL := t1(L,H) = t2(H,L) and similarly with q(·, ·).
Proposition 3.3 No symmetric grand mechanism with full participation will earn
the seller her Myerson payoff in any equilibrium that satisfies the forward induction
criterion.
Proof Since the seller sells the good in all states of the world, in a symmetric
mechanism
q¯ = q =
1
2
(3.1)
qHL = 1− qLH . (3.2)
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I first show that the high type of bidder 1 never strictly prefers truth telling to
announcing she is the low type when the seller earns her Myerson payoff.
Lemma 3.4 In any symmetric grand mechanism with full participation that earns the
seller her Myerson payoff, type H of either bidder is indifferent between announcing
H and announcing L.
Proof To ensure participation by the low type of bidder 2 we need
α(qLHvL − tLH) + (1− α)(qvL − t) ≥ 0
or equivalently that
αtLH + (1− α)t ≤ αqLHvL + (1− α)1
2
vL. (3.3)
Suppose that the high type of bidder 1 strictly prefers to tell the truth in the
seller’s mechanism (i.e. following rejection of her collusion contract):
α
(
1
2
vH − t¯
)
+ (1− α)(qHLvH − tHL) > α(qLHvH − tLH) + (1− α)
(
1
2
vH − t
)
≥ αqLH∆v + 1
2
(1− α)∆v (3.4)
where the second inequality is due to (3.3).
Now note that the maximum expected surplus from the trade is equal to
S := α2vH + 2α(1− α)vH + (1− α)2vL = αvH + (1− α)vL + α(1− α)∆V. (3.5)
Define
W := α(qLHvL − tLH) + (1− α)
(
1
2
vL − t
)
.
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The expected surplus accruing to the bidders is
2
[
α
(
α
(
1
2
vH − t¯
)
+ (1− α) (qHLvH − tHL))
)
+ (1− α)W
]
> 2
[
α
(
αqLHvL +
1
2
(1− α)vL
)
+ (1− α)W
]
= 2α2qLHvL + α(1− α)∆v + 2(1− α)W (3.6)
where the inequality follows from (3.4). So the maximum payoff accruing to the seller
is
S − 2α2qLHvL − α(1− α)∆v − 2(1− α)W < αvH + (1− α)vL − 2α2qLHvL − 2(1− α)W
≤ αvH + (1− α)vL
where the strict inequality follows from (3.6) and the second inequality follows since
2α2qLHvL ≥ 0 and W ≥ 0 by type L’s individual rationality.
Thus, the seller can only earn her Myerson payoff if type H of bidder 1 is indifferent
between announcing H and L in the seller’s mechanism. But when this is the case
we can construct a collusion contract as in Proposition 3.2 and define a strategy such
that bidder 1 always announces L following the rejection of her contract. Further,
this strategy, along with truth telling by bidder 2, constitutes a forward induction
equilibrium within the seller’s mechanism. Type L of bidder 2 is thus excluded
from any mechanism when we apply the forward induction criterion and the seller’s
expected payoff falls below the Myerson payoff.
Suppose a mechanism earns the seller her Myerson payoff. Since type H of bidder 1
is indifferent between announcing H and L in the seller’s mechanism, t ≤ 1
2
vL; other-
wise one can construct a collusion contract as in Proposition 3.2 and define a strategy
such that bidder 1 always announces L following the rejection of her contract. This
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strategy, along with truth telling by bidder 2, constitutes a forward induction equi-
librium within the seller’s mechanism. Type L of bidder 2 is thus excluded from any
mechanism when we apply the forward induction criterion and the seller’s expected
payoff falls below the Myerson payoff, a contradiction.
Consider the collusion contract that specifies that both bidders always announce
L. If their true types match, each is awarded the good with equal probability and
no additional transfers are made. Otherwise, the type H bidder is awarded the good
with probability 1 and pays her type L rival 1
2
vH . To show that this contract is
incentive compatible for both bidders, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5 If the seller’s mechanism earns her Myerson payoff, then
1
2
vH − t ≥ α
(
1
2
vH − t¯
)
+ (1− α) (qHLvH − tHL) .
Proof Suppose not: 1
2
vH < qLHvL − tLH ≤ 12vL − tLH where the last inequality
follows from the monotonicity of q. Then
tLH <
1
2
vL − 1
2
vH .
From the type H individual rationality constraint
t¯ ≤ 1
2
vH +
1− α
α
(qHLvH − tHL).
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The seller’s expected payoff is
α22t¯+ (1− α)22t+ 2α(1− α)(tHL + tLH)
< α22
(
1
2
vH +
1− α
α
(qHLvH − tHL)
)
+ (1− α)22t+ 2α(1− α)
(
tHL +
1
2
vL − 1
2
vH
)
= α2vH + 2α(1− α)
(
qHLvH +
1
2
vL − 1
2
vH
)
+ (1− α)2vL
≤ α2vH + 2α(1− α)
(
1
2
vH +
1
2
vL
)
+ (1− α)2vL
= α2vH + αvH − α2vH + αvL − α2vL + vL + α2vL − 2αvL
= αvH + (1− α)vL
a contradiction.
Now we show that the collusion contract is incentive compatible (after the seller’s
mechanism is resolved):
For type H
α
1
2
vH + (1− α)
(
vH − 1
2
vH
)
≥ α1
2
vH + (1− α)1
2
vH
where the inequality follows since qLHvL − tLH ≤ 12vH by the previous lemma.
For type L
α
1
2
vH + (1− α)1
2
vL ≥ α1
2
vL + (1− α)
(
vL − 1
2
vH
)
.
3.5 The Colluder’s Problem
In this section I write down bidder 1’s collusion proposal problem, given the seller’s
mechanism.
As seen above, an important feature of modelling collusion as a proposal from
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one of the bidders is choosing the appropriate reservation utility for the receiver
to use in the proposer’s mechanism design problem. Here we formally incorporate
the proposer’s posterior following rejection of the proposal. Let βr2 represent bidder
1’s belief over bidder 2’s types following the rejection of the collusion proposal. In
general there are no restrictions on βr2 but applying such refinements as the intuitive
criterion may be used to focus on particular rejection beliefs. Note that due to
Myerson’s [13] inscrutability principle, we can assume without loss of generality that
bidder 1’s proposal reveals no information to bidder 2. The receiver’s reservation
utility is derived as an equilibrium payoff in the seller’s mechanism, given βr2 . Let
E(M,βr2) be the set of equilibrium strategies in the seller’s mechanism M (played non-
cooperatively) given bidder 1’s beliefs βr2 . Suppose the seller offers the mechanism
M = {q1(·), q2(·), t1(·), t2(·)}. Let
U2(v2, β
r
2) ∈
{
Ev1 [v2q2(σ1(v1), σ2(v2))− t2(σ1(v1), σ2(v2))]
∣∣(σ1(v1), σ2(v2)) ∈ E(M,βr2)} .
U2(v2, β
r
2) is the reservation utility for bidder 2 given bidder 1’s rejection beliefs β
r
2 . If
the set on the left hand side is not singleton, bidder 1 would be afforded the greatest
scope for collusion by choosing the infimum element of the set; i.e. imposing the
worst possible equilibrium for bidder 2 following rejection. In general, this can be
any equilibrium. Fix βr2 , and U2(v2, β
r
2). Let Ai(M) ⊆ Ti be the set of bidder i’s types
that participate in the seller’s mechanism M . A collusion proposal P is individually
rational if
Ev1
[
v2q2(φ(v1, v2))− t2(φ(v1, v2))− y(v1, v2)
] ≥ U2(v2, βr2) (3.7)
for all v2 ∈ A2. The notation Ev1 is the expectation operator taken over the random
variable v1. A crucial difference from Che and Kim’s [5] model of collusion is that
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their notion of individual rationality requires that the right hand side of (3.7) is 0, or
more generally, equal to the reservation payoff of bidder 2.
Let Ii represent the information bidder i has following the the announcements
made from m and any information revealed by the seller’s mechanism. A collusion
proposal P is incentive compatible if, given Ii, each type of each bidder prefers to
take the actions prescribed P . Formally,
Evi
[
viqi(φ(vi, v−i))− ti(φ(vi, v−i)) + (−1)i+1y(vi, v−i)|Ii
] ≥
Evi
[
viqi(φ(v
′
i, v−i))− ti(φ(v′i, v−i)) + (−1)i+1y(v′i, v−i)|Ii
]
for all i and all vi, v
′
i ∈ Ai.
Finally, bidder 1’s collusion problem is to choose P to maximize
Ev2
[
v1q1(φ(v1, v2))− t1(φ(v1, v2)) + y(v1, v2)
]
such that P is individually rational and incentive compatible.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have illustrated the limitations of studying the problem of collusion
in auctions as being managed by a disinterested third party. In particular, I have
shown that Che and Kim’s [5] robustly collusion proof mechanism is susceptible to
collusion when a bidder proposes collusion and equilibria are refined to satisfy the
forward induction criterion.
In future work I will build on the framework outlined in Section 3.5 to study
the general mechanism design problem of the seller who faces bidders who can self-
organize collusion.
117
References
[1] Masaki Aoyagi. Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions. Journal of Economic Theory,
112(1):79–105, September 2003. 3.2
[2] Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell. Optimal collusion with private information. RAND Journal of
Economics, 32(3):428–465, Autumn 2001. 3.2
[3] Susan Athey, Kyle Bagwell, and Chris Sanchirico. Collusion and price rigidity. The Review of
Economic Studies, 71(2):317–349, April 2004. 3.2
[4] Gorkem Celik and Michael Peters. Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design. September
2012. 3.2
[5] Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim. Robustly collusion-proof implementation. Econometrica,
74(4):1063–1107, July 2006. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6
[6] Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim. Optimal collusion proof auctions. Journal of Economic Theory,
144:565–603, 2009. 3.2
[7] Vianney Dequiedt. Efficient collusion in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory,
136:302–323, 2007. 3.2
[8] Pe´ter Eso˝ and James Schummer. Bribing and signaling in second price auctions. Games and
Economic Behaviour, 47(2):299–324, 2004. 3.2
[9] Drew Fudenberg, David Lavine, and Eric Maskin. The folk theorem with imperfect public
information. Econometrica, 62(5):997–1039, September 1994. 3.2
[10] Rodney J. Garratt, Thomas Tro¨ger, and Charles Z. Zheng. Collusion via resale. Econometrica,
77(4):1095–1136, July 2009. 3.2
[11] Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort. Collusion under asymmetric information. Econo-
metrica, 65(4):875–911, July 1997. 3.2
[12] Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort. Mechanism design with collusion and correlation.
Econometrica, 68(2):309–342, March 2000. 3.2
[13] Roger B Myerson. Mechanism design by an informed principal. Econometrica, 51(6):1767–1797,
December 1983. 3.4, 3.5
[14] Gregory Pavlov. Auction design in the presence of collusion. Theoretical Economics, 3(3):409–
455, 2008. 3.2
[15] Luc´ıa Quesada. Collusion as an informed principal problem. October 2005. 3.2
118
[16] McAfee. Preston R. and John McMillan. Bidding rings. American Economic Review, 82(3):579–
599, June 1992. 3.2
[17] Shiran Rachmilevitch. Bribing in first-price auctions. Games and Economic Behaviour,
77(1):299–324, 2013. 3.2
[18] Andrzej Skrzypacz and Hugo Hopenhayn. Tacit collusion in repeated auctions. Journal of
Economic Theory, 114(1):153–169, January 2004. 3.2
119
Conclusion
Despite a wealth of important examples of informed parties designing and implement-
ing mechanisms, or instruments of trade, relatively little theoretical work studies the
problem. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, striking differences appear
relative to cases where the mechanism designer is uninformed or the informed player
is not the mechanism designer.
From the technical side, in the first chapter I demonstrate that the unique incentive
constraints faced by the informed principal can lead her to choose to be ignorant in
order to maintain a strategic advantage when offering a contract to an agent. That
the principal refuses to acquire full information despite: (a) it being costless to do so;
(b) being able to employ the most general mechanisms available; and (c) being able to
choose her most favourable full-information continuation equilibria, makes this result
particularly notable.
From a more applied side, I show that considering the informed principal’s problem
forces the modeller to change perspective when considering such details as the space
of mechanisms available to the principal or how to properly refine the set of equilibria.
More specifically, in a moral-hazard environment in the second chapter, I demonstrate
that it can be insufficient to consider only the typical point-contracts that pay a
fixed wage associated with each observable outcome when the principal has private
information about the productivity of the worker; I show when more general menu-
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contracts can improve the principal’s payoff. Further, in the final chapter, I show that
considering bidder-led collusion in auctions forces the modeller to take into account
the proposing bidder’s strategic incentives when deciding on the appropriate set of
equilibria to consider; specifically, the modeller should pay particular attention to
the proposer’s undominated strategies. Such a change in perspective lays bare the
restrictiveness of seemingly innocuous assumption such as forcing collusion contracts
to deliver to the receivers their reservation utility fixed from before entering the
seller’s mechanism. I show that deriving the receivers’ participation constraints via
equilibrium play in the seller’s mechanism and allowing beliefs to change in response
to actions in the collusion contracting subgame can dramatically alter how we expect
collusion to affect the seller’s revenue.
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• Dr. W. Glenn Campbell and Dr. Mark K. Inman Scholarships in Economics,
2005, $2000
• Shaw Family Foundation Scholarship, 2005, $1000
Research Experience
• Research Assistant, Professor Charles Zheng, Department of Economics, Uni-
versity of Western Ontario, Fall 2012 - Spring 2013
• Research Assistant, Professor Ben Lester, Department of Economics, University
of Western Ontario, Summer 2010
Teaching Experience
• Instructor, The University of Western Ontario
– Intermediate Microeconomic Theory I - Summer 2012
• Graduate Teaching Assistant, The University of Western Ontario
– Intermediate Honours Microeconomics II - Winter 2010, 2012
– Intermediate Honours Microeconomics I - Fall 2009, 2011
∗ Responsibilities included occasional lectures.
– Senior Research Seminar in Economics - Fall/Winter 2010/2011
∗ Responsibilities running occasional tutorials and counselling students
on their research.
– Microeconomics II - (Ph. D Level) Winter 2009.
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∗ Responsibilities included running weekly tutorials.
– Macroeconomics I - (Ph. D Level) Fall 2008.
∗ Responsibilities included running weekly tutorials.
– Introductory Economics - Fall/Winter 2007/2008
• Tutor, Intermediate Macroeconomics (honors undergraduate), 2005
Service
• Graduate Representative, Committee for Academic Policy, Department of Eco-
nomics, University of Western Ontario, 2009/2010
• Editor, Western Undergraduate Economic Review, 2006/2007
• Vice President of Communications, Economics Students’ Association, 2005-2007
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